The Design And Analysis Of Attribute-based Signature Algorithm

The attribute-based digital signature system can be fine-grained division identity,and its identity is a set of descriptive attributes. A signer can sign validly when hepossesses some certain attributes, or some specific access control structures. Because ofthe emphasis on application of the anonymity of identity and distributed network system,the attribute-based digital signature system has many advantages compared with theidentity-based cryptography. The attribute-based digital signature scheme also has moreintuitive, flexible and extensive applications, so many scholars pay attention to it, and itis currently a hot research topic in the field of public-key cryptography. The papermainly focuses on the design of a safe, reliable and practical attribute-based signatureschemes, emphasizing on multi-authority attribute-based signature scheme,attribute-based signature scheme without a trusted authority, signature of key escrow,provable security issues and so on.Our works can be summarized mainly as follows:1. A multi-authority attribute-based signature scheme is designed with access controlstructures, where the attributes of users are monitored by different authoritiesrespectively and it is required that these authorities can not communicate with eachother, and be managed by a center attribute authority (CAA). Security analysis shows thatthe proposed scheme is secure against forgery attack and collusion attack, and at thesame time, this scheme has some advantages, such as protecting the signer’s privateinformation, and a higher efficiency in signature.2. A multi-authority attribute-based signature scheme is designed in a large universeusing access structure tree to classify fine-grained attributes. In the meanwhile, thesecurity of the scheme is systematically proved equal to computationalDiffie-Hellman problem. If the assumption of computational Diffie-Hellman problemholds, the scheme is secure against existentially unforgeability attack and collusionattack.3. In order to solve the restriction that multiple attribute authorities can not communicatewith each other and these multiple attribute authorities are managed by a centralattribute authority (CAA), a multi-authority attribute-based signature without a centralauthority is designed. In the scheme, central attribute authority (CAA) is removed,sothat the security of a multi-authority attribute-based signature is no longer subject tothe central attribute authority (CAA).Consequently, the scheme increases the system’ssecurity and applicability. In the meantime, gives the scheme’s security proof in this paper.4. In order to solve the key escrow problem of attribute-based signature scheme, anattribute-based signature scheme without a trusted central attribute authority (AA) isfirstly presented in this paper whose private key is generated by the attribute authority(AA) and the user commonly, thus ensuring that the attribute authority (AA) can notimpersonate the user’s signature and effectively guaranteeing the safety of the system. Inthe meanwhile, the corresponding security model is defined, and the scheme is provedsecure equal to computational Diffie-Hellman problem.5. To solve the delegation of the signing rights in the attributes-based signature scheme,an attribute-based proxy signature scheme is provided in this paper in which theoriginal signer delegates his private key to a proxy signer with some special attributesto sign some message on behalf of the original signer. The proposed scheme isanalyzed and proved that it possesses some security of proxy signature, such asdistinguishability, verifiability, strong unforgeability, strong identifiability, strongundeniability, anti-misuse and anti-collusion attack.6. A provable secure attribute-based proxy signature is devised through further study onattribute-based signature scheme. We firstly give the formal syntax of anattribute-based proxy signature and the formal security model in the random oracle.The scheme is proved to be secure against existential forgery under selectiveattributes and adaptive chosen-message attack. Its security can be reduced to thehardness of the computational Diffie-Hellman problem.