The Research Of Urban Public Infrastructure Construction Responsibility Transfer From State To Market

In contemporary China, a lot of urban public infrastructure servicehas been unloaded to private parties because of rapid urbanization processand limited local public finance. For example, some local governmentsadopt a policy apparatus called affiliating infrastructure, which relievesgovernments from certain public service like providing public green area,traffic infrastructure, or even affordable houses, while attaches these workto the obligation of private commercial developers.Private developers take over certain public infrastructure servicefrom public sector according to affiliating infrastructure. The similarinstitution is known as land use exactions or development exactionsin American law. And this research means to provide a sketchycomparative review on its evolution pedigree, i.e. how this institution origins from the beginning, how it booms under the need of welfareadministration and administration state and finally becomes variants aslinkage zoning and inclusionary zoning. General principle of publiclaw informs us that the trajectory of land use exaction also reflects theextension of state responsibility in the context of welfare administration.Responding to peoples’ constitutional rights, the policy of linkage zoningand inclusionary zoning has changed the passive appearance of traditionalregulation: compared with traditional land use exactions, they function asmore active instruments to push certain social policies forward, whiletraditional institutions like development exactions and impact feeonly mean to diminish negative externalities. Besides, from a regulatorystate perspective, inclusionary zoning policy has a regulatory purpose ofresidential class integration, which reveals that modern regulatory statehas reached beyond economical efficiency, and non-commodity valuessuch as social solidarity become priorities.Observed in an internal perspective of judicial review, in spite of itsinstitutional edge under regulatory state, land use exactions might runagainst just compensation clause in federal or state constitutions thus beexplained a kind of regulatory taking, since it compulsorily imposes stateresponsibility onto private parities. To deal with it, judicial agencyestablished formalism judicial review standards over time, includingNollan-Dollan Rule, to curb development exactions from wandering too far away. Judicial review played significant parts especially in earlieryears.An external perspective of judicial review unfolds a complexlandscape of ongoing game among external variables like developmentexactions, judicial review, democracy process, the stress of localcompetition and market self-restriction. Due to the impact of modernregulatory state and institutional limits of judicial branch, however,judicial review is caught in a dilemma. It does not enjoy such asignificant part as expected. This situation somehow mirrors the generaldifficulties challenging judicial function in the background of modernregulatory state.In conclusion, this research provides a detailed discussion ondevelopment exactions policy in America, which could be a usefulcomparative reference for China’s institutions like affiliatinginfrastructure and affordable housing policy.