The formation process of ocean public order has been argued oreven conflicted with following debates: freedom or control, openness orclosure, inclusive use or exclusive use, and finally formulated a dualstructure which includes the freedom of high sea and the exclusivejurisdiction of coastal States to near seas. But the process isn’t finalizedand has been still ongoing which, to some extent, reflects the tensionbetween the ideas of freedom of the seas for inclusive use and the closurefor exclusive purpose. During this process, according to their ownpolitical philosophy, natural and geographical environment as well aseconomic and technological level of development and other factors,different countries put forward to different ideas and designs to oceanpublic order. It’s a process of emerging needs and responds to the needs.Traditionally, China has been seen as a land state even she has a longcoast line. But, as a matter of fact, China is a marine geographicdisadvantaged state and meanwhile an emerging extensive user of the oceans. The interpretation of the U shaped lined of SCS should keep abalance of exclusive and inclusive interest, which is able to reach theconsensus of the international community in order to make the relevantclaim has both moral and normative basis, but also can meet the demandof China’s rise.In cases involving territorial sovereignty and maritime delimitationdisputes, maps are a kind of evidence about which all States are veryconcerned, for maps can clearly and directly verify or refute the claims ofrelevant States, and thus play a significant part in the course of territorialdelimitation. Since the mid-19th century, China’s had been suffered greatchallenge and humiliation mainly from the seas. On the other hand, formore than thirty years, China’s development and revival largely shall alsodue to the strategy of open to overseas. The U-shaped line in the SouthChina Sea and relevant maps are of great significance for China in itsendeavor to safeguard its historic interests, which also has been subject tofrequent questioning and challenges by the bordering States andinternational community. State practices, as well as the reaction andreaction of the parties, concerning the maps of SCS are actuallyexpression of their concerns for oceans public order in the South ChinaSea.Although map evidence plays a significant role in demarcationcases, its evidentiary value shall not be overestimated, except such maps fall into the category of physical expressions of the will of the State orStates concerned. Usually map will be regarded as second-handed insteadof original evidence, and as circumstantial evidence rather than directevidence. The admissibility and probative force of map depends on atleast the following five factors:1, whether it reflects the will of the Stateor States concerned;2, whether it is accurate or objective representationsof the realities on the ground;3, whether it was produced neutrally;4,whether it is consistent;5, whether it received a clear recognition or tacitconsent of States concerned. The international adjudicator enjoysparticularly wide discretion in determining the weight of map evidence inthe process of reconstruction of the facts.This dissertation gives a reinterpretation to the U-shaped line bytaking an inclusive approach to oceans order. Firstly, it analyses thepossible significance of the map evidence in the South China Seademarcation, and its relationship with historic rights, marine resources aswell as freedom of navigation. Secondly, it points out the nation-state ofconsciousness and the concept of maritime order behind differentU-shaped line theories. Then, it tries to point out, as an emerging worldpower, how to properly interpret the U-shaped line in today’s world, whatkind of oceans order China needs and how to deal with inclusive andexclusive arrangements in the South China Sea. |