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Practical Research On The Double Principal-Agent Model And Supervision Management Of The Non-Operating State-Owned Assets

Posted on:2013-08-11Degree:DoctorType:Dissertation
Country:ChinaCandidate:W DuFull Text:PDF
GTID:1229330398976359Subject:Management Science and Engineering
Abstract/Summary:PDF Full Text Request
At present, state-owned asset management company is one of the principal ways to administrate the state-owned asset in china. National endowment appoints state-owned asset Management Company and the subsidiaries of the state-owned asset management company constitute the state-owned assets management system. For prefecture-level city, the establishment of state-owned assets Management Company’s aim is to promote local economic and social development, and set up financing platform for local government. State-owned assets Management Company’s capital includes the operating assets and non-operating assets in two parts, wherein the non-operating state-owned assets accounted for a considerable proportion. This dissertation mainly studies how to supervise and manage this kind of state-owned asset.First, this dissertation study of non-operating state-owned assets supervision modes. Non-operating state-owned assets are the material basis to realize government functions. They are mainly for the provision of public goods. Their allocation mechanisms are based on the government. The non-operating state-owned assets’ configuration goal is to seek social benefits and concerning whether the social justice, development and stability are maintained. Non-operating state-owned assets are the material basis of achieving social efficiency and justice, so the contents of performance evaluation are the efficiency, effectiveness and fairness. Based on that, we build the non-operating state-owned assets supervision and performance evaluation system.The country endowment appoints the state-owned assets Management Company and subsidiary constitute the three-level management system of state-owned assets. The dissertation then focuses on the two single principal-agent issues of the non-operating state-owned assets. One is the principal-agent issue between the Cooperation and its subsidiaries, without considering the superior constraint. The other is the principal-agent issues between country endowments appoint and the State-owned Assets Operation and Management Cooperation, without considering the lower constraint. Through the analysis we believe that, company of state-owned asset management should reduce the performance incentive intensity for the growth and innovative subsidiaries, and should increase the performance incentive intensity for the mature and conservative subsidiaries. We also believe that, the company’s operating performance should be highly incented, and the social benefits should not be highly incented by the country endowment.The dissertation later discusses the double principal-agent issues of the State-owned Assets Operation and Management Cooperation. Through the analysis we conclude that, the country endowment should invest in some new social public utilities, in order to realize the efficient operation of non-operating state-owned assets; the country endowment should execute specialized management of the non-operating state-owned assets, in order to enhance the non-operating state-owned assets value; the country endowment should strengthen supervision of the non-operating state-owned assets, in order to increase the value of these asserts.After that, we study on the principal-agent issues of the non-operating state-owned assets based on the new classical economics. We get the results that, principal and agent with compatible contracts can eliminate the endogenous transaction cost caused by the moral risk.Finally, the dissertation devotes research to the issues of supervision and management of the non-operating state-owned assets in city XX. In this city, one part of non-operating state-owned assets is supervised by the country endowment appoints, the other part is supervised by the Bureau of Finance. The country endowment appoints supervise the assets mainly through the XX investment company. To evaluate XX Investment Company, the financing ability should be considered, and the investment contribution rate on Infrastructure investment should also be considered.
Keywords/Search Tags:Non-operate, State-owned assets, Principal-agent theory
PDF Full Text Request
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