| At present, the contradiction of capital supply and demand deficiency is serious in low-income group of Urban and Rural and small and micro enterprises. On the one hand, the formal financial institutions is shortage of supply for small and micro enterprises, causing enterprises to face credit ration and finally to finance from informal financial markets. On the other hand, capital supply is monopolistic in informal financial markets; the providers improve capital interest rate higher than the national legislation by their influence. But the low-income group and small and micro enterprises are in a weak position, the fund scarcity could affects the survival and development of the enterprises, the enterprises have to finance from the folk supplier by high cost, which causing loan market distortion. How to solve the finance dilemma of the low-income group and small and micro enterprises, solve the problem of capital supply deficiency are the research emphasis in economic theory.For a long time, credit ration is the core of the credit market equilibrium theory, which is the mainstream theory for interpreting the supply deficiency of the low-income group and small and micro enterprises. The theory holds that if the interest rate exceeded the critical point, owing to adverse selection and moral risk which are caused by information asymmetry, the banks’ expected return would decrease instead., the regulation of price mechanism on loan market would be failure, so the banks is insufficient for the credit market, especially for the low-income group and small and micro enterprises. This paper thinks that the theory of credit market equilibrium only interprets the credit insufficient supply which is the representation of credit ration. The root cause for affecting credit supply is market risks including systematic risk and individual risk. Because of the asymmetric of risk and return, the banks reluctant to increase supply even though interest rate rose. Therefore, the credit market equilibrium is the equilibrium of risk cost and risk return (risk compensation). The theory of credit ration’fails to get the characteristics of loan market equilibrium, so it can’t reflect the essence of loan market equilibrium accurately.This paper researches the economic characteristics of micro-credit’ supply and demand, quasi-public goods character of micro-credit, concrete manifestation of micro-credit market’s information asymmetry, and the resulting loan default risk by introducing the information asymmetry into the analysis of credit risk and return equilibrium mechanism from the risk factors of micro-credit market, not by using traditional paradigm of credit ration. The paper makes hypothesis about the behavior characteristics of both supply and demand of micro-credit, puts forward the equilibrium mechanism of micro-credit risk and return, analyzes the operation status of this equilibrium mechanism, proposes the equilibrium mechanism theory of micro-credit risk and return, and applies this theory in empirical analysis of micro-credit risk and return equilibrium in China, thus explains for the supply deficiency of loan market.Here is the core proposition of this essay, the equilibrium mechanism theory of micro-credit risk and return is a kind of credit transaction mechanism which is operating under the constraint of incomplete market information, Institutional deficiency of financial market system and credit environment, it comprises price mechanism, mortgage guarantee mechanism, relationship loan mechanism and reputation mechanism. The core proposition strives to break through the traditional credit ration theory, and brings factors such as information asymmetry, market imperfection, and regulation unsoundness into the framework for analyzing the cost and profit of marginal risk, and establishes a demand-supply regulation system for micro-credit market which is based on price mechanism, and supplemented by many other non-price mechanisms, eliminates risk factor’s distortion on market signal and price mechanism, and realizes risk and return equilibrium of micro-credit market. The argumentation of this core proposition has great significance to the innovation and practice of micro-credit theory, and the financing difficulties of low-income group and small and micro enterprises.The paper carries out research on the core proposition as the main basis of logical deduction analysis, comparative and induction, micro and macro analysis. The paper is consisted of six chapters, the chapter one is introduction, introduces the research background, the basis of choice the subject, core proposition, research methods, innovation and deficiency. The main text contains three parts. The fist part is the chapter Ⅱ, describes research review of correlation theory. The second part is foundation theory innovation containing chapter Ⅲ and chapter Ⅳ. Chapter Ⅲ analyzes status of micro-credit risk and return equilibrium in developing and developed countries, and comparatively analyzes the risk and return equilibrium mechanism of intentional micro-credit’s typical model. Chapter Ⅳ proposes the equilibrium mechanism theory of micro-credit risk and return. The third part which is consisted of chapter Ⅴ and chapter Ⅵ makes empirical analysis for micro-credit risk and return equilibrium in China by based innovation theory, and gives optimal path for the implementation of micro-credit risk and return equilibrium in China. The main research contents and important viewpoints of every chapter are as follows:Chapter II is literature review, hackling and expanding research problems. It reviews research literature for market equilibrium mechanism, loan market equilibrium mechanism, and risk and return equilibrium mechanism, and micro-credit risk and return equilibrium mechanism. On the basis of loan market equilibrium characteristics, the paper summarizes related research of the loan market equilibrium, mainly inductive the interpretation of information asymmetric theory on the loan market equilibrium. Because of information asymmetric, the risk factors of loan market would influence loan market’s supply and demand. The supply of credit funds not only depends on interest rate but also the risk level of loan projects with given interest rate. Rising of interest rate does not necessarily bring income increase. The expected income level would decrease because of high default probability caused by project’risk increased, when exceeding a certain interest rate. So, loan market equilibrium is the risk and return equilibrium, credit ration is the manifestation of loan market equilibrium. The author considers previous research perspective has limitation, which formulates loan market insufficient supply as credit ration. The research emphasis for credit insufficient supply should be credit risk and credit return and their equilibrium mechanism. The analysis for credit market equilibrium couldn’t restricted to the supply and demand framework, must consider non-price factor influencing risk. In addition, the research for micro-credit risk and return equilibrium must pay attention to quasi-public goods character of micro-credit, concrete forms of information asymmetric and default risk in micro-credit market.Chapter Ⅲ makes international comparison to micro-credit risk and return equilibrium mechanism. It summarizes main micro-credit patterns in the world nowadays, makes comparative analysis from solving quasi-public goods supply, information asymmetric, mortgage guarantee deficiency and high risk of micro-credit, and comments intentional micro-credit risk and return equilibrium mechanism. The paper thinks micro-credit originates from Bangladesh and develops in developing countries of South Asia, Southeast Asia, Africa, and Latin America. This fact implies that micro-credit is the method for solving credit market failure. The micro-credit market failure mainly is supply regulation failure, which price only reflects nominal return of micro-credit market supplier but not the influence of credit risk on supplier return. Therefore, in order to increase supply for micro-credit market, it is should preventive and control micro-credit risk and Increases its risk premium. From the view of financial evolution, micro-credit is not different with common credit in essence. If it could effectively innovative loan technology, formal financial institutions also could serve as micro-credit suppliers, the special micro-credit institutions plays complementary function. By the increase of market experience and promotion business capacity, the micro-credit loaners have chances to finance in formal financial market. US-European micro-credit institutions adopt the development method of cooperating with normal banks, managing micro-credit business by the credit management experience of formal financial institutions. When the micro-credit customers develop mature, they turn to formal financial institutions’customers.Chapter Ⅳ constructs the theory of micro-credit risk and return equilibrium mechanism. Firstly, it describes market environment and heterogeneity of micro-credit. Micro-credit loaners are the low-income group in economic system and the vulnerable groups in finance market. Because of lacking funds, their production is with lower isoquanta curve. If they can obtain capital, their productivity would be improved. The micro-credit loaners are willing to bear the higher loan rate, as their marginal productivity of capital is improving. Secondly, it makes hypothesis for the behavior of micro-credit debtor and creditor, thus micro-credit borrowers have more risk aversion than common borrowers as big enterprises. Although the micro-credit borrowers have stronger loan demand, their demand often can’t convert to actual loan demand. The micro-credit suppliers can be both micro-credit institutions such as small loan companies and normal banks. The two class providers make lending decision basis of equilibrium of risk compensation and risk return, not having essential difference. Compared with normal credit market, micro-credit market has obviously different characteristics. Thirdly, it analyzes the for influence factors of micro-credit risk. Micro-credit has obvious quasi-public goods attributes. The information asymmetry of micro-credit market presents as information channels deficiency, information distortion, and information unavailability. The information asymmetry is more serious in micro-credit market than normal credit market. On the basis of the above risk factors, the micro loan default has different characteristics compared with normal loan default, and the micro-credit borrowers have the higher market risk and lower individual risk. Fourthly, it describes the interest determined mechanism, mortgage guarantee mechanism, relationship lending mechanism, reputation mechanism which are help for realizing risk and return equilibrium. At last, it analyzes the result of micro-credit risk and return equilibrium. Banks determine loan interest rate and the size of loan when the marginal risk is equal to income marginal risk cost. The difference between micro-credit market and normal credit market is micro-credit requirement is more rigid and its interest rate elasticity is smaller, so the banks would face a steeper demand curve. The banks’marginal risk cost curve would move toward left upper compared with normal credit market, so the micro-credit market’ supply interest is higher and its size is smaller. The information asymmetry would be relieved by constructing the interest determined mechanism, mortgage guarantee mechanism, relationship lending mechanism and reputation mechanism, then the influence of risk factors on micro-credit borrowers’ capital demand and loaners’ capital supply could be decreased to a minimum, so as to increase the micro-credit’s capital supply and realize the equilibrium of micro-credit risk and return. In fact, micro-credit market is double interest equilibrium.Chapter V analyzes the status and characteristics of micro-credit market. Taking postal savings bank of China for example, chapters V makes empirical analysis of micro-credit risk and return equilibrium, and constructs Logistic regression analysis model for micro-credit default risk and makes preliminary test for the main factors resulting in micro-credit risk and its causality with default rate. The paper reaching a conclusion that the borrowers’ age, marital status and individual prestige have obvious negative effect on loan quality. The borrowers’ regional distribution and responsibility for family, and family property, and annual income and management ability have no significant effect on loan quality. Whether the borrowers obtain loan many times have negative effect on loan quality. So, the dynamic repayment technology has played a very important role in micro-creditChapter VI summarizes the main research results of this paper and provides policy suggestions.The conclusions of this paper is micro-credit market equilibrium is the equilibrium of risk cost and risk return (risk compensation), and the resulted from both price factor and non-price factor. The micro-credit supply deficiency is caused by the information asymmetry. The banks can’t obtain sufficient information about micro-credit borrowers and make accurate judgments of their risk type, so as to provide interest requirements and makes the corresponding risk control measures. The low-income group and small and micro enterprises don’t have enough estate to make mortgage guarantee and satisfy the banks, so they can’t obtain loan from banks which is the basic reason for the insufficient supply of micro-credit. Small and micro enterprises and the low-income group haven’t larger risk by nature. Because the low-income group has poor ability of enduring risk and resisting risk, they are apt to choose low risk loan projects. If it can reasonably determine micro-credit rate, realize flexible mortgage guarantee system, construct effective relationship lending mechanism and reputation mechanism, it could effectively solute information asymmetry of micro-credit market, increase banks’ micro-credit supply, so as to relieve finance dilemma of small and micro enterprises and the low-income group. On the basis of this conclusion, the paper provides some suggestions for improving micro-credit risk and return equilibrium mechanism from innovating mortgage guarantee system, relieving information asymmetry, increasing micro-credit suppliers, perfecting credit environment and constructing credit system, realizing interest rate liberalization. |