Game Analysis And Control Research Of The Construction Safety Regulation

Safety regulation is the important means and measures to reduce the riskof the uncontrollable situation during construction and to ensure theperformance of safety policies. In the process of construction, differentinterests of dissimilar parties and the mutual influence make the safetyregulatory issues with the characteristics of complex systems and dynamicchanges, which also make it difficult to predict and control of the long-termregulatory effects. The recent studies on application mainly focus on theexistence of evolutionary stable strategies and analysis of control strategiesbased on the two-person game. While during the construction process, thereare different types of participant, the existing literature lack of research on themulti-game under the conditions of different relations. Thus, the objective ofthis thesis is to investigate the dynamic procedure of regulation multi-gamebetween the authority and main construction participants and to optimize the control strategy.This thesis starts with the analysis of relationship of safety authority andconstruction participants in the regulation game. The dynamic evolutionmethodology combined with System Dynamics (SD) are used to builddifferent strategy analysis platform and optimize the regulation polices. Thetheoretical analysis results are also used in specific engineering project.In particular, this thesis firstly develops a System Dynamic multi-gamemodel between the authority, contractor and engineer, without or with theconsideration of information delay. The stimulation result shows after a longtime, all the game players can not reach the Nash equilibrium. For the casewith information delay, the dynamic oscillation amplitude will increase,which makes the safety regulation more difficult. A differential regulatorystrategy is proposed to deal with the unreachable Nash equilibrium and isvestified its dynamic stable effect for the model by the stimulation result.Subsequently, considering the bounded rationality of decision-makers, the construction safety regulation dynamic evolutionary multi-game model isinvestigated. Raplication dynamic equation is introduced to descript thechanges of different game parties’ strategy choices. Theory analysis andcomputer simulation validate the existence of evolutionary stable strategywith the application of dynamic penalty policy.This thesis further analyzes the dynamic procedure of regulation gameconsidering the non-coopration relationships between the constructionparticipants. The effect of the setting of penalty factor k in controlling theviolation actives is investigated. Both the control effects of static anddynamic penalties are analyzed. And the investigation shows that differentparticipants with different violation gains have the dissimilar risk preference.Then, with the target of strategy optimization, a differential game modelbetween the safety authority and construction participants which havedifferent types is proposed. The study result shows an optimization contralstrategy should consider the probability of the authority’s behavior. A multi-game equilibrium is obtained and is vestified with stimulation andstable theory.Finally, this thesis introduces the design and application of theregulatory mechanism in a specific case. The safety information of theconstruction project could be got by using the specialized safety checklist. Anapplicable safety regulatory instrument based on theoretical analysis results isproposed, and the application effect proves that a reasonable regulatorysystem will help to improve the level of safety control during the procedureconstruction.