Research On Coordination And Pricing Polices In B2C Supply Chain

With the development of electronic commerce, consumers’attitude and manner have changed. Electronic commerce also reformed the enterprise’s surviving environment. Electronic channel is widely used because of its characteristics, such as cost efficiency and large covering range. The thoughts about traditional supply chain management have been modified. Manufacturers and retailers add the e-channel and sell products by Web. New distribution channel models have emerged with the e-channel. E-channel and traditional channel have conflicts in the new distribution channel models. Also supply chain efficiency is low due to the double marginalization effect. In this thesis, we discussed the problem of supply chain coordination with contracts and pricing policies in supply chains with B2C e-channel, main contributions are as fellows:(1) The problem of coordination with contracts in supply chain with hybrid channels is studied. Two patterns are concerned:one is retailer’s sales efforts affect demands in traditional channel and c-channel; the other is retailer’s sales efforts affect demands in both supply chain and channels. Research shows that revenue-sales efforts cost contract could coordinate the supply chain. Supply chain and members’profits are worse off in pattern one, while better off in pattern two.(2) This paper also discussed the coordination of supply chain when retailers sell surplus products through e-channel after sales season. Two distribution models are considered:one is retailers sell products by traditional channel in sales season while sell inventories only by e-channel after sales season; the other is bricks and clicks retailers sell products by traditional channel and e-channel in sales season, while sell inventories only by e-channel after sales season. Coordination and supply chain members’ Pareto improvement could be achieved by the modified buy back contract.(3) The optimal pricing strategies of members are discussed in hybrid channel supply chain. Two different pricing policies are concerned:one is the Stackelberg strategy with manufacturer-leader; the other is the Bertrand pricing strategy. We have conclusions that there exits channel conflicts in moderate values of parameters. We also find that there always exists coordination mechanisms in the form of transformer payment which could make one pricing policies better than the other one.Finally, conclusions and contributions of our research in this paper are summarized, as well as future research contents.