| Chinese stock market has developed gradually for 18 years in the process of economic system transformation since it established. The stock market structure and operation mechanism which have certain particularity and complexity in such an emerging market are quite different from foreign mature markets. Abnormal trading, high-frequency price fluctuations and volatile price movements are the normal characteristics of Chinese stock market, but the volatility and frequency exceeding a certain limit mean the risk aggregation. Though the stock market volatility is caused by a variety of factors, the fundamental reason is the results of the interaction of lacking coordination of benefits among market subjects. Listed companies, investors, intermediaries and regulators which represent the benefits of different groups, make up a complete system of stock market participation, and their behaviors’changing has a direct impact on the stock market fluctuations. Objective analysis and study on the behavior motive, characteristics and strategies of Chinese stock market participants help us understand the influence of participants’behaviors on stock prices and the impacts on the market. And it can help us come to a better understanding of the characteristics of Chinese stock market and problems existing.In the paper, the main purpose is to analyze the behaviors of participants in Chinese stock market from theoretical and empirical perspectives with asymmetric information theory, options pricing theory and incomplete information game, and makes policy recommendations. In the paper, there are six aspects of the research work:(1) The stock market status and the definition of participants. The article defines the research object based on the empirical study on the interactional relationship of Chinese stock market and macroeconomic, and preliminarily analyzed the status and role of listed companies, investors, intermediaries and regulators, in order to pave the way for the study.(2) The study on the behaviors of listed companies’seasoned equity offerings. Based on the analysis of the features, causes and financing conditions of Chinese companies’seasoned equity offerings after split share structure reform, the paper adopts event study method to analyze allotment, placements, private placements, convertible bonds and separation of trading convertible bonds empirically. The conclusion of the empirical analysis is that convertible bonds, placements and private placements can increase the enterprise value, but allotment and separation of trading convertible bonds can decrease the enterprise value. According to new features of equity refinancing behaviors of listed companies, the paper advances relevant policy recommendations.(3) The study on the behaviors of the transfer of listed company control. Analyzing the particularity of the transfer behaviors and motivation to transfer of listed company control in China from the perspective of the connotation of control, the paper use financial indicators method in order to establish asset restructuring performance evaluation index system, and take advantage of principal component analysis to set up a comprehensive scoring model for the sample so as to study the overall performance of listed companies having asset restructuring. At the same time, paired samples T test and regression analysis method are used to test and compare the performance of different types of listed companies’reorganization, and analyze the main factors affecting the performance of asset restructuring. In order to improve the performance of listed companies’ reorganization, to regulate related party transactions, prohibit unfair insider trading and improve the information disclosure system are quite necessary. Government should encourage listed companies to enhance core competitiveness through mergers, joint and other forms of strategic restructuring of capital operation.(4) The study on behaviors of restricted shares reduction of listed companies. At the present time, there is no work to study the behaviors of large reduction of holding of restricted stock after lifting of the ban from the perspective of asymmetric information. The reduction of restricted stock price model under the conditions of asymmetric information is a completely market-oriented program which is based on the incentive design for the institutional investors and the people who lift the ban to reduce the restricted stock. The model is based on maximizing the return of the main subject in the market, and is regarded the transfer value as an incentive method. The price of the reduction of restricted stock of the model is the equilibrium solution under joint objectives between the people who lift the ban and the institutional investors. As the price of reduction of holding determined by the model takes the liquidity premium and the related factors into account, the price accepted by the institutional investors can relieve the pressure and impacts caused by the reduction of restricted stock and avoid the large scale fluctuation of market in order to make the market operate stably.(5) The study on investment behaviors of the securities investment funds. On the basis of asymmetric information problem existing in the fund market, the paper analyzes the main manifestations, herding behavior and feedback behavior, the investment behaviors of the securities investment funds. On the whole, the securities investment funds in our country exists herding behavior. When the trend of the stock market is rising, securities investment funds present positive feedback behavior. In the opposite, they appear negative feedback behavior. In order to eliminate the problem of the herding behavior and feedback behavior, and bring the function of stabilizing the market by institutional investors into play, the managers should offer the financial derivatives timely, adopt short-mechanism and the credibility mechanism of the fund managers, bring much more operating space to funds, and regulate the acts of the securities investment funds.(6) The study on the behaviors of participants in equity issue market. The current study is confined to establish static game model of incomplete information with two or three players to study listed company information disclosure violations. During the period of the approval of stock issuance, the paper establishes an incomplete information dynamic game model with three players, company companies to be listed, intermediary and regulator. During the period, after the approval of the stock issuance to the pre-market stage, the signaling model between listed companies and investors is established. Game equilibrium shows that regulators must strictly supervise the proposed issuer and intermediary agencies’ behaviors to spread false information in the market in order to enhance quality requirements of overall listed companies, and reduce the differences between listed companies and investors’ losses caused by the asymmetric information in the distribution market.At last, the paper concludes the relevant researches, and point out limitations of the study and the prospect. |
