The Formation Mechanisms Of Collective Corruption

Collective corruption, which is often more complex and harmful than individual corruption, has become an increasingly common trend of corruption in recent China. However, there is an obvious lack of the theoretical knowledge for us to understand collective corruption. This research, based on the context of China, aims to uncover the formation mechanisms of collective corruption from the structural, behavioral, and cognitive perspectives, explains the conditions for its stability and then puts forward some basic strategies to curb its spreading.From the structural perspective, the emergence and penetration of collective corruption, roots in the incompatibilities and even conflicts within the governance structure, the process of decision and implementation, and the institutional environment in transitional China. To be specific, the reproduction of power rent chains creates the immediate incentives for collective corruption, the restructuralization of administrative relationships by quanzi provides the informal institutional conditions, the failure of internal supervision and the weak punishment of bribery crime leaves the institutional space, and the projectification of local governance works as catalyst.From the behavioral perspective, collective corruption is the product of strategic operation of corrupt actors, manifested as the networking of corrupt exchange. The strategy of corrupt actors is to couple the dynamics of corruption networking, namely the motivation of increasing private interests safely and the pulling force coming from the quanzi norm. The networking of corrupt exchange includes the connection, integration and maintenance stages, each with different tactics. Corrupt brokers play key roles in this networking process, which can be classified into coordinator, liaison, "consultants", gatekeeper, representatives, and multiple insider.From the cognitive perspective, collective corruption is a process in which corrupt actors continue to adjust their moral cognitions. Self-rationalization is a cognitive defense mechanism, which is used to weaken the unethical nature of their behaviors by restructuring their moral content. Self-rationalization increases the tolerance of actors to corrupt action, leading them stepping into the more serious corrupt crime. When the rationalizing ideologies of corruption are shared and accepted by the group members, they become the psychological foundations of collective corruption.This study analyzes the stability of collective corruption by introducing the evolutionary game theory. On the one hand, we focus on the evolutionary dynamics between supervisors and supervisees, discover the conditions supporting the diffusion of corruption in the governmental organizations. On the other hand, we analyze the collaboration between corrupt actors within corrupt alliance, and point out the key elements that affects the stability of corrupt alliance, namely opportunistic behavior, collusive rents, collaborative costs, and the distribution ratio of return and cost.It needs the continuous efforts of the party, state and society to curb the formation and spread of collective corruption in China. This study proposes the some basic strategies:at the structure level, the key is to inhibit the expansion of power rait chains, to strengthen the ability of social accountability, to reduce the uncertainty within government organizations, and to promote the punishment effect for bribery crime; at the behavior level, the key is to eliminate the corrupt brokers, blocking their construction of corruption network; at the cognitive level, the key is to clearly define the moral boundary of power, to promote members’reflection on the responsibility of their actions, and to construct the group-level moral identity.