A Study On Descriptions From The Perspective Of Semantically Ambiguous Articles

This dissertation is about a heatedly debated topic in the field of philosophy of language - descriptions, focusing on two main tasks:1) to provide sound semantic analysis of the difference between indefinite and definite descriptions; 2) and to provide reasonable accounts for attributive uses and referential uses of descriptions in various contexts.Influenced by Donnellan’s observation, the author holds that Russellian and Strawsonian approaches to descriptions are the two sides of the same coin and they are complementary in accounting for various uses of descriptions. So, this dissertation composes a systematic effort to bridge the gap between these two seemingly incompatible approaches so as to provide a unified but coherent theoretic framework to account for phenomena of descriptions completely. This is achieved by postulating that articles composing descriptions are semantically ambiguous, i.e., articles have two potential functions, quantificational one and referential one. Within the confines of this ambiguity thesis, the research unfolds in the following way:In chapter 1, a working definition of descriptions is given at the outset, presupposing that our language contains indefinite and definite descriptions. After introducing the concept of Horn Scales, we put forward the idea of semantic contrast set. With this idea in place, we provide adequate reasons for assimilating the articles to such a semantic contrast set. Then, we argue that speakers in communication conventionally and systematically use indefinite and definite descriptions to construct anaphoric chains, which, as we see, suggests that articles are also complementary in denoting referential function. At last, an ambiguity thesis about the semantics of articles is proposed. And this ambiguity thesis serves as the theoretical foundation for the whole research process.Chapter 2 begins with an objective presentation of Russell’s classic account of the indefinite and definite contrast in quantificational relations that the articles denote. Then, we provide some reasons for adopting Russell’s idea of quantificational articles as a part of our ambiguity thesis about the semantics of articles. And then, Russell’s account is modified to handle the problem of quantifier domain restriction. These modifications place us in a good position to provide a Russellian account of the complementary relationship holding between the articles. At last, by exploring the Russellian account of anaphoric chains, we locate a problem that Russell’s account of the indefinite and definite contrast fails to handle.In chapter 3, Donnellan’s distinction of uses of descriptions is introduced. Along with this distinction, we present the ambiguity thesis it invites, which suggests that Russell’s account of descriptions is not complete. In order to successfully explain Donnellan’s distinction, particularly the referential uses of descriptions, the dedicated Russellians have introduced two Neo-Russellian approaches, namely, the pragmatic approach and the Godelian approach. From the methodological perspective, we argue that these two new approaches are off the track of being Russellian. And this, however, proves that any unitary account of various uses of descriptions is destined to fail. So, on the empirical and methodological grounds, we think the ambiguity thesis is preferable to the two new approaches in explaining various phenomena of using descriptions in communication, and in this dissertation we will stick to the ambiguity thesis to carry out our research.At the very beginning of chapter 4, we divide articles into two categories: quantificational ones and referential ones, and point out referential articles are context-sensitive. Then, we explicate Kaplan’s content/character distinction to provide a necessary tool for presenting the semantics of context-sensitive expressions. Combining Kaplan’s distinction with the familiarity theory, we arrive at the semantic characters of the two referential articles:RID (The hearer is not acquainted with the speaker’s referent under the assumption that the referent fits the nominal)and RD(The hearer is acquainted with the speaker’s referent under the assumption that the referent fits the nominal). And then, with characters of referential articles we can reasonably explain the referential uses of descriptions, that is, the indefinite description refers to a novel object while the definite description refers to a familiar one.In chapter 5, we try to provide sound explanations for some difficult problems of using descriptions in special cases from the perspective of ambiguity thesis. First, we demonstrate utterance containing empty referential descriptions in the subject position fails to express proposition. Then, we show that the hearer will understand the proposition expressed by an utterance containing a non-empty referential description if he can identify the speaker’s referent. Afterwards, we argue that referential descriptions do not trigger scopal ambiguity, and thus they are rigid designators. At last, a reasonable account of anaphoric chains containing referential descriptions is provided and a solution to the anaphoric chain puzzle is also offered by revealing the antecedent nature of indefinite descriptions.