On Ryle’s Behaviourism

In The concept of mind, Ryle holds nothing back when he confess that his psychology is behaviouristic. However, his behaviourism is different from traditional behavourism. First, those basic concepts constituted this kind of behaviourism, such as "mind" and "behaviour", are not the same as those we have recognized. Therefore, the relationship between physical and mental which it attempt to investigate should belong to another field. And if to be exact, that is the relationship between disposition and intelligent behaviour. Second, Ryle had said that the logical state of disposition is neither categorical not hypothetical, so we cannot call it "semantic behaviourism" or "linguistic behaviourim" for framing. It is said that he intends to reduce all dispositional statements into hypothetical propositions, this view cannot be true. Last but not the least, traditional behaviourism is a sort of theory in its account of our standing of other minds, but Ryle’s behaviourism is not restricted in the same account. The explanatory versions which have continued till today, such as "ontological or metaphysical behaviourism", methodological behaviourism", Eclectic behaviourism" and so on, still have various omissions and mistakes. They also disagree with each others.We have learn from these historical lessons that, only by finding out the problem domain or the scope of psychology which fits with mid-Ryle’s philosophical interests can we positioning his behaviourism further. Mid-Ryledevoted to set up a psychological method of common sense for philosophical treatment. This psychological method attempt to clear up all sorts of opposition and conflict that dualism arouse, the style of which can be estimated between of Husserl’s phenomenology and pragmatism. The philosophical interests of TheConcept of Mind can be illustrated as that, it intends to deal with two interrelated questions:how to actualize a philosophical therapy for traditional behaviourism which has sunk deep into field-category mistake, and how to set up "philosophical behavourism".There is also further research suggesting that Ryle’s behaviourism has not only methodological significance but also ontological significance. The methodological behaviourism contains two main contents:validation of mind by behaviour, inference of behaviour by mind. The traditional behaviourism equates validation of mind with verification of fact and substitutes assumed physical process for the true situation at inference level. To meet the treatment needs of both sides, Ryle try to uncover the specific logic of validation by showing the model of disposition, and clarify the fact at inference level by analyzing the scope of "knowing how". Ontological behaviourism involves ontology of world and ontology of mind. The major viewpoints of the former can be concluded as follows. There is only one world exists. The one is the world of everyday life that, treating the dispositional behaviour as basic unit of which, as existence of behaviour as its existence. The major viewpoints of the latter can be concluded as follows. Mind is not entity, its activity cannot be recognized as occurrence or events. As potency of behaviour, it must lie outside the world.