The Research On Implementation Of Central Economic Policy By Local-government

The implementation is essential for the institution design, but lots of Law and policies did not get local governments'Strictly implementation, such as house price curb, cultivated land protection, anti-unfair competition, environmental protection, we treat this phenomena as soft policy—constraint which learned from Janos Kornai's soft budget—constraint. So the question is that why the central-policies don't get strictly implementation by local governments since China is highly centralization of the governmental power? and why the central government stand for the local governments' unlawful practice? how to control the local government?At the same time, the central-government put forward slogans of legal administration and government ruled by law, and many local-governments have promised to promote legal administration. so why does the government promise to legal administration? why does the government constrain itself?China miracle means that a country has achieved rapidly economic growth without completed legal system and good justice system,it is a challenge to the law and development theory. the phenomenal industrial growth in China has been assigned the combination of political centralization and economic decentralization. More and more scholars,such as Qian Yingyi,Weingast,Zhou Li'an, regard the fiscal decentralization as the major institutional framework of China miracle for it provided officials with enough incentives to develop local economies, and the local experiments have provided a way for institution innovation. especially, the centralized state power plays a key role when compared with Russia. but the decentralization also leads to inter-regional market segmentation, free-cost land, environmental pollution and so on. and the local-governments don't implement the Law and central-government's polices.For these reasons, the central-government strengthen legal administration and government ruled by law, which would help the central-government restrain the local governments and officials. Legal administration has changed the cost-profit structure of the competition for investment, and forced the local governments compete for investment by legal environment rather than preferential policy. the interactions between central-government and local governments composed a path of the evolution of rule-of-law and legal administration.This dissertation containes six parties, the first party reviewes the exsited literature. The previous studies focused on the functions of legal-administration and government ruled by Law, but neglects the reasons of governments' and officials' incentives to promote the legal administration; some thesises have noticed the local-governments' unimplementation, but did not analyse why did the central government stand for the soft institution-constraint.Then chapter one is about the legal competition and race to bottom, the competition for investment are race to top and race to bottom simultaneously. then we describes the interactions of land institution between the central-government and local governments.Chapter two characters seven implementation strategies of local-government with Matland's ambiguity-conflict model, we calles it selective policy implementation. then we analyses why didn't the local-government implement the central policies and why the central government standed for the local governments'unlawful implementation.Chapter three turns to the governance strategy change of central-government, and points out it would force the local-governments compete for better legal environment. China is now following the path of rule of law and legal administration.Chapter four discusses the fault of the central-government's governance strategy, such as strong capital Vs weak citizen, strong central-government weak Vs local-government, and we should improve the incentive and restraint mechanism, include institutional decentralization and coordinating restraint.The last chapter is the conclusion.