Research On The Debt Financing Governance Of Listed Companies And The Related Functions

Debt financing of listed companies is not only a major fund-raising mode, but also an important tool for corporate governance. Effective debt financing corporate governance not only reduces agency costs between shareholders and managers, but also is conducive to protect the interests of creditors, thereby enhancing company performance. In this thesis, our research is based on extensive references to domestic and international literatures. At first, we make a theoretical interpretation for the mode, governance body and methods of debt financing governance. Then we make use of real examples to study governance impact and effect for debt financing. Examining the reality of debt financing governance for listed companies as a starting point, followed by focusing on disclosure of accounting information and banking supervision, this thesis makes a comprehensive and systematic study on governance issues of debt financing.At first, based on incomplete contract theory and social responsibility theory, we analyze the topic that stakeholders'interest protection can only be based on "limited" key stakeholders; then we make an in-depth study on the main body and the ways of governance to be carried out to protect the interests of shareholders. Based on this study, we put forward a governance mode to use bank creditors as main body for key stakeholders. Secondly, using mean value test, Pearson correlation analysis and other methods, we inspect the status quo of debt financing governance for listed companies. This research is to pave the way of subsequent further study on impact and function of debt financing governance. This research demonstrates that, with the Chinese split share structure reform going smoothly, the state of debt financing governance for listed companies makes very encouraging changes; However, high current liabilities rate and low long-term debt rate for listed companies show that creditors not only lack enthusiasm but also have no opportunity to participate corporate governance; Again, using principal component analysis and multiple linear regression methods, we systematically and comprehensively examine the impact of debt financing governance as respect to source structure and debt maturity structure. We find that an increase in short-term liabilities will increase the firm's performance, while long-term debt and bond payable will be no significant relationship to the company's performance. Therefore, in order to effectively reduce agency costs and to improve corporate performance, the listed companies should take full account of debt financing, optimizing the structure of corporate debt financing, appropriately increasing the proportion of long-term debt and corporate bond financing ratio; Finally, using Logistic regression, principal component analysis and multiple linear regression method, respectively, we test the role of accounting information and banks in debt financing governance. The study find that companies with poor quality of accounting information tend to borrow from banks rather than to issue bonds to obtain debt financing; it also finds that debt contract accounting information of private companies is more useful than that of state-owned enterprises; it shows that banks do not take an effective role in debt financing governance for listed companies, and that banks are also not able to take responsibilities for monitoring companies alternative to corporate governance mechanisms.In this thesis, based on incomplete contract theory and social responsibility theory, it builds a framework of governance mode, within which banks dominate as the main body of key stakeholders. To give full consideration to the interests of bank creditors, in addition to strengthening the protection interest of bank creditors based on laws and regulations at institutional level, we also set accounting standards relevant to information disclosure of interest protection of banks and other key creditors and coordinate with related disclosure related to the "financial institution accounting standards". After extensive pilot tests in some places, we request listed companies to mandatory disclose interest protection information of bank creditors after being audited. In addition, within companies we request to reconstruct board of directors and board of supervisors with banks participated. Under board of directors and in parallel to remuneration and other commissions, we also request to reconstruct an interest protection commission consisting of banks and other key stakeholders to provide service to signing of debt contracts and follow-up tracking.At the same time, the thesis makes a pioneer study on the reality of situation for debt financing governance of listed companies. It also systematically examines the effects of accounting information quality difference on preferences and choices of debt financing and on usefulness of the impact of debt covenants. Through the design of internal and external governance indicators, it examines the corporate governance relationship issues between banks and debt financing companies. It not only provides empirical basis for construction of governance model for key shareholders with bank creditors as main body of it, but also provides a number of policy recommendations to actively improve company performances and improve the corporate governance effects for debt financing companies.