| The information dissymmetry is the core problem which perplexs the government regulation and cause regulatory collusion which lower the efficiency of regulation.The development of game theory and information economics promoted the birth of incentive regulation theory. The incentive regulation theory shows that through the mechanism design while satisfying certain conditions, the principal can incent the agent and overcome the information dissymmetry problem.Although incentive regulation theory is the latest development of the regulation economics, this theory still exists some problems. Successful inspiritment need certain conditions, but these conditions usually can't be satisfied simultaneously in the regulation practice which makes the incentive regulation theory disjointed with the regulation practice.Through relaxing the restriction of the principal's transpayment quantity and the type of client's risk preference, the author analyzed government regulation theory when the incentive compatibility conditions of the regulation agency can't be promised. The interest of collusion lured the regulation agency to misreport the true information of the business enterprise. Use or not the information of the regulation agency would make different influence to the social welfare. Analysis showed that made use of the information of the regulation agency would lower the social welfare when the probability of say true word lowered certain level. Therefore, when incentive compatibility conditions of the regulation agency can't be promised, the principal must be careful to the usage of information coming from the regulation agency and be necessary to acquire information of the business enterprise from other outlets. This suggest that the consumer play an important role in government regulation.Then, the author introduced consumer to the regulation model with the role of information deliverer. Through regulation hearing, the princapal can get related information of business enterprise from the consumer while satisfying participation and incentive compatibility conditions of the consumer. The author compared different transfer payment method in China and American regulation hearing system and found that different method could make different influence to the social welfare. This suggest that hearing system has important influence on regulation effect. Through regulation hearing, the principal can acquire informationg and get rid of the lean upon regulation agency and restrain the regulation collusion effectively.Considering the principal also may pursue self-interest, a regulation model was built from a complete interest group perspective.In this model, the ruler(principal) and the regulation agency can pursue private benefit respectively. The whole regulation system was consisted by four interest groups:the ruler, the regulation agency, the business enterprise and the consumer. The optimal price level and its fluctuation direction were analyzed when the ruler was assumed to pursue minimum social dissatisfaction. Analysis showed that as long as each interest group had some influence that the optimal price level would between the marginal price and the monopoly price. When the consumer group could be divided into some sub-groups, the optimal price structure of government regulation showed essential difference to the price structure of market mechanism. The parameter which influences certain sub-group consumer usually influenced other sub-group consumer in the same time. Cross subsidy was also easy seen in the government regulation situation.Positive analysis is the examination of the conclusions of those regulation models. In the first, By seting up an examination index system, the author checked up the regulation collusion and its influence on social welfare by using 10 years data of Chinese electric power industry. Analysis showed that regulation collusion existed in Chinese electric power industry. Regulation collusion resulted in the loss of social welfare which had the performance of several technique decline and slow-moving growth of total factor productivity. The conclusions of experience analysis and theory models are consistent and thus carry on a verification to the conclusions of those theory models. In the second, the author analyzed the electricity reform of "same net same price" in China to examine the optimal regulation pricing and the cross subsidy behavior. Analysis showed that the "same net same price" is the cross subsidy in regulation. The reform lightened the burden and dissatisfied motion of country dwellers but made some remote mountain area could not switch on electricity for a long time. The experience analysis of "same net same price" reform verified two conclusions of theory models:The price which makes minimal social dissatisfaction usually is not the price which makes maximal social welfare; By using different pricing strategies on different consumers, especially cross subsudy pricing strategy, the total social dissatisfaction can be reduced.At the conclusion and suggest part of this dissertation, the author pointed out that regulation collusion resulted in low efficiency and lowered social welfare level. Therefore, the regulation collusion must be restrained. Based on the conclusions of regulation models, the author suggested that restrain collusion through popularize and meliorate the regulation hearing system. Considering the problems in Chinese hearing system, the author put forward some suggestions to meliorate Chinese hearing system.
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