Research On The Control Mechanism Of Food Safety

With the development of social economy, the problem of food security has been solved and more concerns are focused into food safety. However, there is still a big gap between the requirement of consumers to food quality and that of the food. How to guarantee the quality of food has become a focus now.This dissertation focuses on food quality safety control and initiates foundamental and creative study on the system operation process to solve the problems of market malfunction and government malfunction. This research proposes that the function of non-government organization in the food safety control should be strengthened and a triangle structure including government, industry association and enterprise should be established. Based on this, study is carried out on relationship among government, industry association and enterprise with the tool of game theory. It mainly includes:Firstly, this dissertation summarizes the risks of food quality safety domestically; points out market malfunction and government malfunction. Then the forming process of food quality risk is analyzed and the research suggests that the participation and supervision of industry association should be strengthened and finally forms the supply chain quality control system based on the triangle structure including government, industry association and enterprise. Moreover, this triangle structure operation system is analyzed and index system for evaluating food quality safety is put forward.Secondly, relationship among government, industry association and enterprise in the triangle control system is analyzed with the tool of game theory. Currently there are several Principal-agent relationship existing in food supply chain supervised by the government: The relationship between upstream and downstream chains of the food suppliers and the relationship between food supervision organization and links of food supply chain. Based on the two relationships, this dissertation establishes game theory model among food production enterprises, studing how the upstream and downstream enterprises on the food supply chain could form a coalition to prevent food quality safety risk; establisheds game theory model between government and food production enterprise to find out the optimal strategy for the government supervision to food production enterprise.Next, reverse selection and morale risk exist in the upstream and downstream enterprises of the food supply chain and the involvement of food industry association would assist the solution of them problems although there might exists" voluntary failure". This research establishes the model of conspiracy on food industry association, analyzing every condition of anti conspiracy when entriprise askes the industry association to suprivise. This dissertation also establishes the extented conspiracy model on food industry association, anaylzing when there is government supervision, every condition of anti conspiracy when entriprise askes the industry association to suprivise and concludes corresponding countermeasures.This research introduces stimulation system, focuses on the basic characteristic of principal-agent relations in food safety management and put forwards two stimulation systems: quality guarantee contract as an explicit incentive mechanism, establing explicit incentive model based on Marcov chain and analying it. Through this system, behavior of supplier can be controlled and the negative incentive effect can be carried out; secondly, using fame as a implicit incentive system, through establishing a long-term cooperation with enterprises on up and down stream links on food supply chian to guarantee long-term profit of raw material suppliers on upstream and control behavior of suppliers to create positive incentive effect.