| From the beginning of 21st century, the governance risk of world-known companies, such as Enron, WorldCom, Xerox, and Pamalet caused the volatility to the capital market and the financial market, which makes people realize that corporate governance risk reduces the value of the company, furthermore, with the cumulative corporate governance risk, it will lead to the emergence of the financial crisis. Therefore, how to define the corporate governance risk, and prevent its accumulation and amplification becomes a key issue of corporate governance in the post-Enron era.Many achievements of empirical studies indicate that the ownership structure of the modern companies presents the tendency of more and more centralized in the post-Enron era. The concentration of ownership structure which has replaced the dispersion of ownership structure becomes the main feature of modern corporate governance. In the concentrated ownership structure, the importance of agency problem between stockholders and managers has been replaced by the agency problem between the controlling shareholders and minority stockholders. The agency problem caused by the controlling shareholders becomes the principal contradiction, and the controlling shareholders governance risk also becomes the important source of the modern corporate governance risk. Therefore, it is very important to avoid the controlling shareholder governance risk, and construct the benign government environment orientated by the long-term performance and the value increment of the company, and realize the positive interaction between the controlling shareholders and other stakeholders in the current world and the East Asia market including China.The deficiency of the related studies is that there is no systematic study on the integrating of the controlling shareholders governance risk into the corporate governance risk system, and there is less study on the controlling shareholders' governance behavior and function in the different ownership structure, and the behavior mechanism as well as the corresponding risk level measure caused by the controlling shareholders governance risk.Based on the above thoughts, taking the early warning of the controlling shareholders governance risk of Chinese listed companies as the research topic, and by empirically analyzing the controlling shareholders governance risk of Chinese violated companies, this paper systematically studies the characteristics of the controlling shareholders' governance risk in the different ownership structure, and finds the dominant factors that influence the controlling shareholders' governance risk. On this basis, according to the characteristics of the Chinese capital market corporate governance, the early warning index system of the controlling shareholders' governance risk and the model of the risk warning are constructed.Based on the review of the literature, this paper analyzes the controlling shareholders governance mechanism by using mixed gamble, and on this basis studies the cause of internal and external corporate governance mechanism to the controlling shareholders governance risk. The results show that when the controlling shareholders choose the governance risk behavior, it needs to make a balance to the available excess amount of private income of controlling right, when the expected excess return surpasses a certain level threshold, the controlling shareholders governance risk will be produced. The factors that influence the expected excess return threshold level include: the risk loss cost (violation penalties), risk-control mechanism due to internal and external governance mechanism (the probability of violation that may be found, the probability of small and medium-sized shareholders and other stakeholders to monitor), the controlling shareholders' risk preference (the probability of controlling shareholder to choose risk behaviors),ownership structure(controlling factors). Increasing the expected return of controlling shareholder risk management threshold levels can reduce the risk of shareholder governance. The interaction of various factors can reduce the risk of controlling shareholder governance, but the function of all factors is related to the ownership structure. In the different ownership structure, the mechanism of the function of all factors is different. From the company's long-term and sustainable development perspective, controlling shareholders and medium or small shareholders and other stakeholders should establish a cooperation, win-win situation, harmonious corporate governance mechanisms. If we want to keep sustainable development, we should increase the future level of the remaining proceeds and the ratio of direct holdings, and optimize the ownership structure.Based on the theory analysis, using the data of Chinese violated listed companies from 2001 to 2007, utilizing the multiple statistical analysis methods, such as the intelligent neural network calculating method, variance analysis, the controlling shareholders governance risk factors of violated listed companies are empirically analyzed and data-mined, also the dominance factors that influence the controlling shareholders governance risk are determined, and on this basis, its warning model is instructed, and also the validity of the warning model is examined by using the quality of corporate governance reflected by The Special Self-Report of Listed Companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen in 2007, and using the model warning results, the Chinese listed companies governance risk is empirically analyzed the results , the conclusions of theoretical analysis are confirmed by the empirical results .Base on the above research work, the following conclusions are drawn:Firstly, under the uncertain internal and external circumstances of governance, the governance risk of the controlling shareholders is come into being by the governance risk, governance preference and risk restriction. Under the current corporate governance system, the factors such as the control intensity of the controlling shareholders, the corporation ownership structure, the board of shareholders mechanism, the board of directors mechanism, the board of supervisors mechanism, the companies ownership circulating status, the deviation degree of the controlling shareholders' voting rights and cash flow rights, the capital size, the debt lever, the companies investment value, the actual controller type, the level of regional credit, the legal environment are important factors that influence the controlling shareholders governance risk cost, risk preference, the risk chance and the risk income. In the different ownership structure, these influencing factors in the different forming mechanism influence the controlling shareholders governance risk cost, risk preference, the risk chance and the risk income, and then decide the level of the controlling shareholders governance risk.Secondly, the characteristics of the controlling shareholders' governance risk are not the same in the different ownership structure. Relatively, the ownership absolute concentration companies: such as the internal mechanism of the board of supervisors, the external legal environment and market environment, as well as the regional credit environment have the important effects to the forming and inhibiting of external governance mechanism; the ownership relative concentration companies: the factors such as the balancing mechanism among shareholders, the insiders ownership status, the board of shareholders mechanism, the external market environment and the credit mechanism have the important effects to the forming and inhibiting of the risk. The ownership relative concentration companies: the factors such as the balancing mechanism among shareholders, the insider ownership status, the board of shareholders mechanism, the external market environment and the credit mechanism have the important effects to the forming and inhibiting of the risk. The ownership relative dispersion companies: the factors such as the deviation degree of corporate control right and the cash flow right, the board of shareholders mechanism, the board of supervisors, as well as the type of controlling shareholders have the prominent function to the controlling shareholders' governance risk, and external governance mechanism has no significant inhibitory effect to the controlling shareholders' governance risk.Thirdly, in China, external mechanisms such as credit mechanisms, product market competition mechanisms are important complementary law governance mechanisms, which have a significant inhibitory effect on risk management of the controlling shareholders. The strengthening of external mechanisms such as our credit system, market mechanisms product market mechanisms will help reduce the risk of controlling shareholder governance. Different types of controlling shareholder have different risk capacity. Relatively speaking, controlling shareholder of state-owned enterprises have better transparent information disclosure, and due to the existence of state-owned asset management sector and the corresponding role in the regulatory impact of state control, the risk of state-owned shareholder governance is relatively weak .Therefore, strengthening the controlling shareholder's information disclosure will help curb the risk of controlling shareholder governance.
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