Operator Incentives By Monetary Rewards In State-Owned Listed Companies

Based on the contracting theory, the agency theory and combined with ultimate owner and managerial power theory, this dissertation researches on monetary rewards incentive in state-owned listed companies. Compensation incentive is considered as one of ways to solve principal-agent problem, but the peculiarity of agent chain of state-owned companies in our country——there are both economic agent relationship and administration agent relationship, result in the differences in compensation incentive between state-owned listed companies and companies with other ownership nature. Recent studies on managerial power show that managerial power may be a part of agent problem in the determination and execution of the compensation. For this reason, the dissertation aims to research on the determinants on monetary rewards incentive in state-owned listed companies and investigates the influence of ultimate owner and managerial power. By these, I hope the dissertation can provide some empirical evidences for the development and improvement of incentive mechanism of state-owned companies in our country.The study divides operators of state-owned companies into four crossed hierarchies (management authorities, chairman of the board, board members, management authorities and board members), and tests the determinants of the change of compensation and the fixed compensation. Based on the empirical results, the conclusions of the dissertation are:Firstly, in state-owned listed companies in our country, the sensitivity between operators' monetary rewards incentives and performance of the listed companies is not high. Especially for broad members, management authorities and board members, there are strong rigidity in monetary rewards incentives and this can't stimulate the operators of state-owned listed companies to improve the performance of the listed companies. The effects of monetary rewards incentives are not ideal.Secondly, the different natures of ultimate owners result in the differences of operators' monetary rewards incentives, but local controlled listed companies don't provide more efficient monetary rewards incentives for operators.Thirdly, managerial power exercises influence on operators' monetary rewards incentives, but there are differences between the impaction of managerial power in the determination of operators' monetary rewards incentives in listed companies in our country and in foreign countries. In the state-owned listed companies in our country, because of the absence of the administration agent relationship, operators especially the chairmen of the broad pay more attention to implicit incentives—promotion, and their dependent degree on monetary rewards incentives is slow. Consequently, the enlargement and enhancement of managerial power don't necessarily result in the increase of monetary rewards.