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Research On Strategic-form Endogenous Network Games And Evolution

Posted on:2008-09-07Degree:DoctorType:Dissertation
Country:ChinaCandidate:Y ChenFull Text:PDF
GTID:1119360272966622Subject:Systems Engineering
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The study of the network structure is one of the ways to disclose the complex system structures and functions in natural and social world. Examples include the small world network, scale-free network and network formation games and so on. This methods based on game theory can disclose the individual's microcosmic decision mechanics and has distinct significances for correct understanding of networks in real environments. Currently, most researches focus how the external environments affect the economic behaviors, on the assumption that the players lie on fixed network etc, ignore the fact that players'action and network structure can interact. In this dissertation, the endogenous network models based on 2×2 game are developed to analyses how the link decision and action selection can interact. Some helpful conclusions are given and used to resolve some practical problem. Furthermore, a model for co-evolution of microcosmic game and network is developed.First, the basic frame is built for strategic-form symmetric 2×2 game endogenous network game. After giving the stragetic-form description of the network formation problem based on 2×2 game according as the realistic situations, the models are classified to unilaterally link models and bilaterally link models by the way of link cost paying, and classified to direct link models and indirect link models. The definitions of efficiency and stability are given. These works provide the foundation for father research.The results of unilaterally and bilaterally link models are studied using three classical games as the underlying games, which are Prisoner's dilemma, hawk-dove game and coordination game. The conclusions show that the link cost has no effect on the actions selections for the game that has only single Nash equilibrium. Otherwise, the high link cost may cause the players to select Pareto dominance action for the game that has two equilibriums. The stable networks emerge mostly as the complete network, minimal connection network, star network and empty network.On the assumption that agents adopt satisfaction decision rules and have ability to decide which link can be built, the network evolution models are developed based on bounded rational, which can provide a new explanation for the formation of the complex network. The prisoner's dilemma and coordination game are respectively used to study the cooperation and convention evolution. By the way of multi-agent modeling tools, the simulations show the networks will exhibit the small world character on some parameter ranges. Furthermore, the intrinsic mechanism and difference between the Replicator Dynamics, exogenous and endogenous network evolution model are analyzed.The application of indirect bilaterally link model to engineering project information integration at last. The problem for implementation of information plan can be described by heterogeneous indirect bilaterally link model. The bottlenecks are pointed out using the definition of stability and the solutions are provided by the way of benefit distribution or perquisite. The results show that the successful desigh of the information integration plan must not only focus on the information breakdown system but also analyze the stability of the plan based on the managers'decision.
Keywords/Search Tags:Network formation, Nash equilibrium, Efficiency, Stability, Multi-agent modeling, Small world, Information integration
PDF Full Text Request
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