The Research On Conflict Management In Corporate Governance For Chinese Listed Companies

In order to manage and use conflicts in corporate governance for Chinese listed companies, realizing to improve corporate performance, the thesis integrating present situation and data of corporate governance for Chinese listed company, analyzes the conflicts between big shareholders and small shareholders, independent directors and internal directors, shareholders and managers, then studies the changes of conflict in corporate governance after share-reform.At first, the thesis is based on some theoretical hypothesis and using listed corporate data, and then draw the conclusion through the positive study of the conflict between big shareholders and small shareholders: It is negative relation between stocks ratio of the biggest shareholder and corporate performance", it is negative to corporate performance for the conflict between big shareholders and other shareholders; the negative effect will be small when other shareholders can confine big shareholders; bigger shareholders invade small shareholders, bigger marketing effect is; when biggest shareholder hold the bigger stock ration, it will be more possible for cash share interest; private manipulative listed corporation dislike cash share interest to shareholders.At the same time, the thesis studies the shareholds, whom the independent directors repress, and hold the idea that it is favorable to improve corporate performance with the conflict between independent directors and internal directors. The thesis constructs a mold of the conflict between independent directors and internal directors through three aspects: project decision process of the board of directors; the salary decision between independent directors and internal directors; independent directors' resignation. Based on these models, the thesis brings conflict management strategies that improve and use the conflict between independent directors and internal directors.Meanwhile, the thesis studies the conflict styles, reasons and effects and sets up a game model between stockholders and managers. Based on the model, the thesis getss the Nash equilibrium, and bring several strategies: target convergence; revising managers' salary system; realizing the distribution mechanism between the remaining right and the obtaining right; improving the conflict effect using managers market.Finally, the thesis compares the changes of conflict in corporate performance after share-reform, and then give some suggestion to manage conflicts and improve the corporate performance.