Research On R&D Staff's Incentive Mechanism Of Manufacturing Enterprises

China's manufacturing industry is an important pillar of the national economy. Manufacturing enterprises'technological innovation capability is the decisive factor for its survival and development, and is the direct components for its competitive advantages. In modern enterprises, strategic leadership, developing and effectively using the technology in accordance to corporate strategy, and inspiring staff members for technological changes, are three important driving elements for competitiveness. R&D staff is the main force for technological changes, its technological innovation activities are the key elements to success or failure. How to improve the individual performance of R&D staff, so as to enhance the overall innovation performance, is of great concerns for every business. Management scholars have conducted many researches from different angles on the incentive issues of R&D staff, yet none can be of satisfactory guidance to enterprise practices. Because of the need to practice and theory, this paper initiated the research from the incentive demands of R&D staff, proposed and verified hypothesis for the relationship between the professional orientation and incentive, and hence, completed the research from the aspects of payment incentive and relational incentive. Results deducted from this paper are of significant value both to theory and practice regarding technological innovation management and R&D staff's incentive issues.Following are important results in this paper:Firstly, in the research of professional orientation, it is found out that R&D staff has visible professional orientation whose current distribution is not in favor for rising technological innovation capability.Secondly, in the research of the relationship between professional orientation and incentive demands, it is found out that R&D staff with different professional orientation tends to show significant difference about incentive demands, organization satisfaction and incentive measures. It is possible to enhance work involvement by raising satisfaction to incentive measures. Satisfaction about strong incentive factors can produce positive inspiration while satisfaction about weak incentive factors can eliminate dissatisfaction. The nature of different professional orientation should be considered to design incentive measures.Thirdly, in the research of payment incentive design, it is found out that, by introducing relative performance variable, it is possible to raise the degree of sharing innovation residual while reducing risk cost and incentive cost. Hidden unemployment threats can be substitute forms for significant incentives, to make sharecropping contract more effective. Due to the technological risk, it will reduce the incentive efficiency of sharecropping contracts if R&D staff can trade their technological achievements freely. Fourthly, in the relational contract incentive mechanism study, it is found that R&D staff's psychological demands are important for organization commitment, justice is a key factor for R&D staff's psychological contract development, favorable comments have strong incentive impact to dedicated R&D staff, and reputations have leverage impact to R&D staff's behavior choice upon violations to psychological contracts.Creative points in this paper can be found in four aspects:Firstly, a thorough study of the professional orientation distribution using empirical study made it possible to disclose a new clue for incentive mechanism design.Secondly, a logical model on the relationship among professional orientation based incentive demands, job satisfaction, and work involvement was proposed to justify the hypothesis about professional orientation, incentive demands, job satisfaction, and work involvement. It is justified that R&D staff with different professional orientation tends to show significant difference about incentive demands, focus degree to incentive measures, incentive satisfaction, and work involvement. Strong factors and weak factors for rising work involvement are distinguished.Thirdly, on the basis of the nature of R&D staff's professional orientation distribution, a design of the mechanism from the aspect of risk-share was proposed using principal-agent theory, and hence the research on the incentive mechanism design under threats of hidden unemployment and share-contract under technical risk was conducted.Finally, in the field of the nature of R&D staff's relational psychological contract, the relational psychological contract incentive mechanism was explored using game theory. Against the current unclear academic situation about psychological contract unbalance and psychological contract violation, this paper proposed clear descriptions relative to the situation, and disclosed that psychological contract unbalance is the premise to psychological contract violation. Conditions to show psychological contract violation are justified using game theory.