Research On The Reform Of The Governing Of Chinese Power Listed Business

Chinese power industry is an important basic industry and a state property affluent industry in Chinese economy, whose proportion of GDP is big. As the basic investing factor and daily necessities, it directly influences economic competition, state security and people's living standard. For a long time, thanks to the importance of power industry and economic technical features, its governing pattern is the state-owned and vertical globalization-monopoly governing pattern, whose tradition has not brought the improvement of the industry's efficiency. Thus, the low efficiency of allocation of resources is gradually appearing and the power industry system is becoming the actual reform flash point. With the further reform of Chinese power market, it is facing a more intense competition. Chinese power industry, for its unclear property right in power listed business, not perfect governing pattern, irregular operation of board of directors as well as the lack of effective inspiring, supervising and controlling mechanism, has become an important factor that binds its competition in power business market. Therefore, how to perform an effective governing reform with the help of market competition, create scientific and effective business governing structure and improve the maximum operative efficiency of power business is an inevitable theme in Chinese power system reform.First, the thesis analyzes the governing reform proceedings in Chinese power listed business (CPLB) from the view of system transition,the author thinks that the original rule condition in the governing reform of CPLB is the vertical monopoly national ownership by analyzing the governing reform proceedings in CPLB, this judge replies the theoretical and historical factors that CPLB current status forms, and answers the gift of original rule of the CPLB governing system. The author divides CPLB governing transition into three historical periods, and analyzes the game theory of the benefit and authority between government and business in each period and objectively evaluates the changing characters and achievements in power business and analyses the origin of the governing-reform effective loss in CPLB from the point of"internal person control system", and also shows the not favorable achievements made by CPLB governing reform and its causes.After analyzing the governing of the system gift in CPLB, the author researches from the stock-ownership structure---the basic issue on the governing structure, and from the view of the identification of the stock owners, the author uses the statistic data as well as the proportion among shareholders of the most share, the total share proportion of the five most shareholders, the total share of the ten most shareholders, H index, Z index which represent the stock-ownership-concentrated index to check the status of the stock-ownership structure in CPLB in order to show the quality of the centralized and unified high degree in power listed business, the feature of"extremely strong"state-owned stock, the fictional ownership, the lack of the big real stockholders, the severe control by internal men, the small proportion of circulating stock and the prominent character of inflexible state in nation-owned stock, nation-owned body corporate stock and body corporate stock. The series of problems prove that in CPLB, it exists the defects of the"super control"of the mixed status between government and business and the"internal person control"of the improper funds-sponsors. By checking the evidence of the construction, dimension and concurrent post of the board of directors in power listed business, the author demonstrates that the factors of the poor independence, the weak character, the bigger dimension and the improper inspiring arrangement further prove the"ineffectiveness"of the board of directors in CPLB. By the comparative analysis between home and abroad inspiring ways, the author gets the conclusion that the inspiring ways that senior managers in CPLB use base on the fixed salary and political prospect which is lack of the long-term inspiring effect. Above all, the thesis concludes that because of the not matching between"controlling by internal person"pattern and the stockholder's right structure, the governing structure is not perfect.Next, the thesis answers that on the basis of the motivation of the governing reform in CPLB, it compares the distinction of three governing patterns of economy: British and American, German and Japanese and changing-tracks economy. On the one hand, it reveals the inner logic relationship between different title structure (stock ownership structure) and governing patterns---different stock ownership has its matching governing pattern, which provides the theoretical and practical foundation on the establishment of the governing reform pattern in CPLB; on the other hand, based on the analysis of merit and defect as well as the distinctiveness among three patterns: stock ownership structure, the effect on the board of directors, the inspiring of administrative department and the supervision mechanism. It concludes that different nations have the alternative bases and conditions that match their states and different merit and defect of patterns exist together, we can only consult but not copy, which offers the reference of establishing governing reform in CPLB.The thesis proposes that the internal variant which CPLB should choose is the shareholder's right structure while considering the synthetic analysis of the governing practice, power-reform-route dependency and international governing pattern experiences, the author thinks that from the view of the structure of stock ownership and the governing effectiveness, the stock ownership structure determines the organizational structure, policy-making way, the candidates of the board of directors and supervision, the inspiring and the inspiring towards the administrative department and supervision. In the same time, system culture and market culture are the external variants that are the factors that influence the governing pattern alternative, the thesis answers what the effective space of the governing reform culture in CPLB is and at last proposes that the governing target pattern in CPLB should be the organizational and controlling governing pattern. The thesis also introduces the factors that build the organizational controlling pattern, which prepares for the further illustration of the actual foundation of Chinese alternative organizational controlling governing pattern.Finally, the establishment of the organizational controlling governing pattern aims at perfecting the inner governing structure of business, controlling"internal person controlling"pattern, protecting the benefit-relative person's benefit and improving the business'performance. On this principle of these factors, the thesis starts from the alternative of the targeting guarantee main body in CPLB and from various point of view demonstrate that the guarantee main body in CPLB is the one relative to (central) profit, and proposes that the measure standard of the aim that the business intends to achieve is the maximum of its value. According to the governing guarantee main body that the governing aim proposes, the way of the reform in CPLB is the structural optimization of the stock ownership, the improvement of the board of directors and the recreation of inspiring rewarding chance.Above all, the thesis basic conclusion is that the reform of CPLB is the reform of microcosmic rules and regulations, the original system gift of the reform is the national monopoly ownership; The governing defect and the governing low efficiency of controlling by internal person are the governing reform motivation in CPLB; The governing reform pattern is the organizational pattern; The logic starting point of the reform is the matching between pattern and shareholder's right structure; The aim of reform is to perfect the business governing pattern, control the deficiency governing of the inner person, improve the business governing performance and protect the benefit-relative person's benefit; The routine of the reform is to optimize the shareholder's right structure, improve the board of directors system and recreate the inspiring system.