Interest Protection Of Public Share Holders

The investor's interest is the key of corporate governance. In the last several years, investor protection has been in the limelight among the scholars interesting in Corporate Finance. During the development of our security market, the public investors supply the great of capital, while their benefit has been encroached seriously. It has been an important theoretical and practical subject to effectively protect the benefits of minority shareholders in order to ensure the sustainable development of the stock markets in China.This paper, absorbing the previous research outcomes made by the scholars both in and outside china, studies the problem that the control owner expropriates the interests of minority shareholders from the perspective of ownership structure and further explores the systematic mechanisms of investor protection from the perspective of laws construction and the information disclosure system. This paper consists of six chapters. The first one describes the basic theories and the main research outcomes concerned by the paper. The second one summarizes the problem on public investor protection. We introduce the general situation of public investors and discuss the value to protection their interests. In the third one the ownership structure and the investor protection are discussed. Based on the theories related to corporate governance, we build a theoretical model to analyze the expropriation behavior by control owner for his private benefit under the current ownership structure in China. Meanwhile, we conduct the empirical study with the data from China listing companies. Further exploring the public investor protection based on the law is in the fourth chapter, where the paper focuses on the importance of law enforcement efficiency supported by an theory model and empirical test. The information disclosure system is brought into the fifth chapter. Beginning with the information disclosure system in China, we examine the relationship between the information disclosure system and the investor protection by a theoretic model. In the last chapter, we summary the conclusion of the whole paper and give our Policy Recommendations about law and information disclosure system based on China National Situations.In the frame of ownership concentration of the listing companies in China, analysis on ownership structure is the main theme of the whole paper, guiding all themodels and relevant empirical studies. The core conclusion is that in the current ownership structure, the control owner expropriates the interests of outside investors. From the economic environments, the problems influencing the expropriation are the inferior law enforcement efficiency, inefficiency supervision and imperfect information disclosure system. So the establish of investor protection mechanism depends on how to deal with these problems.The innovations of this paper are: (1) Examining the relationship between the private benefits of control and the investor protection from the perspective of ownership structure and exploring the influence on the investor protection brought by the reform of non-tradable shares. (2) Based on the empirical analysis on the loss of investors, discussing the investor protection problem in the frame of the law and information disclosure system.(3) Focusing the law enforcement efficiency and evaluating the effects of various law enforcement policies.(4) Conducting a theoretical model analysis on the information disclosure about investor protection based on the current institution in China.