Study On Dynamic Stability Mechanism And Governance Of Strategic Alliances

Strategic alliance is very unstable. Despite previous researches contributed to instabilities of strategic alliances, substantive progress had rarely been taken until 1997 when Beamish and Spekman defined accurately the instability of alliances and Yan and Zeng (1999) reconceptualize the instability of IJVs. Henceforth, Das and Teng established the first analysis framework of stabilities of alliances in the 2001. Zeng and Ming established an analysis model in 2003 based on social dilemma. However, take a wide view of these theories, there still exist many problems of the stabilities should been examined deeply. For example, what is accurately the stability of strategy alliances? Whether the major changes or dissolutions caused by changing environment belong to the problem of stabilities? Can strategy alliances maintain stabilization under what kinds of conditions? What are functions of contract and trust which regulate the moral hazards in alliances? How governance is for alliances to obtain stabilities etc.The dissertation follows the logic of dynamic stability. It commences discusses with factors and mechanisms influencing stability of alliances. It then characterizes the stability boundary of alliances and according to this stability boundary it ultimately seeks after the governance models. The dissertation investigates alliances stabilities from property angle and according to the dynamic decisions-making of production pattern based on specialization theory.The dissertation launches on stability of strategic alliances. We think that the stability of alliances is essentially an institution equilibrium, which reflects the decision-making process and interactions of individual self-interest. Thus the alliances governance is to design incentive compatibility institutions to reduce member's incentive of deviating from equilibrium. So we develop an inframarginal analysis model of decision on the efficient level of specialization and the pattern of production. Consideration characters of the properties or resources which invested in alliances, the model can not only explain the process of creating value and appropriable quasi-rents in alliances, which help us to understand instabilities of alliances, and also it can show choosing among internalization of production, specialization of production and exchange in spot markets or in alliances, in witch internal tensions and their mechanisms would...