Economic Explanation Of Shareholder Structure Reform

Shareholder structure as a systemic error left over from history and our capital markets unique structural problems besetting China's long-term development of capital markets. Excessive concentration of state-owned shares in the securities market in our country seriously affected the efficiency and the optimal allocation of resources in scientific management structure of listed companies to establish. May 2005, has more than 10 years of China's securities market, Shareholder structure issue finally started. As of late 2005, completed and entered the reform process listed companies had more than half the total market value, and ShenZhen SME board had achieved fully circulation. All show that shareholder structure reform which resolves the largest historical problem besetting our stock market is in full swing, the Chinese capital market is in a profound institutional change.In the process of this historic institutional change, systematic study of Economics involved in the shareholder structure reform, will be the important guarantee of protecting the interests of parties investors, reducing costs and the successful completion of the reform. This paper study shareholder structure reform systemically and provide reference basis for government decision-making in the era after shareholder structure reform and the further opening up of market conditions, based on non-arbitrage analysis theoretical framework in modern finance and quantitative methods, in conjunction with the actual situation of two groups of 46 experimental companies, from companies' performance and their shareholder structures, rational design of consideration schemes, game analysis between parties investors and the effects of wealth redistribution etc.