The Transformation Of China's Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations Study

In this article, the author thinks intergovernmental fiscal relation is material and dynamic and embodies many forms. Government behaviors are the most important part of these forms, because the governments of all levels are the participators of the intergovernmental fiscal relation. As the result of the intergovernmental fiscal relation, the behaviors of governments reflect the goals and restrictions of governments; however the behaviors of governments also adjust and change the intergovernmental fiscal relation. Analyzing the behaviors of governments can help us to grasp the essence of the intergovernmental fiscal relation. Intergovernmental fiscal competition and equalization are important behaviors of governments and their effects on the formation of the intergovernmental fiscal relation are prominent.With the coming of the decentralization transforms of China, the intergovernmental fiscal competition and equalization have been the influential fiscal phenomenon. What is status in quo of the fiscal competition? How the fiscal competitions effect the fiscal expenditure of local government? Whether the fiscal competitions are in favor of improvement of public service? How the effects of the equalization made by the central government? What does fiscal equalization effects the fiscal effort of local government? Can we estimate the intergovernmental fiscal relation virtually and propose some advices on public policy? All of these questions lead the author to concentrate attention on forming the theoretical framework on the intergovernmental fiscal relation of China's transition and under the framework, to prove the experience of the fiscal competitions and equalization of China and from the angle of view to explain the evolvement of the China's fiscal system.According to the survey on Fiscal Federalism literatures, there are main distinctions of the situation of China. Firstly China is centralization of state power and the fiscal decentralization exists. Secondly people can't vote with food because of the limited flowing of population and local governments have little power in tax legislation. Thirdly officials are commissioned by superiors and there are potential competitions among political elite for the political power. Obviously it is necessary to form the theoretical framework on the intergovernmental fiscal relation of China's transition.