Research On Cooperation And Incentive In Business Incubator

With the rapid development of the technological enterprise incubator of our country, more and more incubators possess both the incubating and investing functions. To realize the balanced and coordinated development of these two functions, it is a must to have the high efficient external cooperation and internal incentive mechanism. This paper made a research of the the type of cooperation, the distribution of profit and the stock incentive compensation of the top management team in the cooperation of technological enterprise incubator, ventures and venture capital by the means of cooperation game, the dynamic game, the contract theory, the system simulation, quadratic programming and so on. The innovative points lie in the following aspects.(1)Research on comparison and choice of the trilateral cooperation type. This paper makes a conclusion through the establishment of multiply modes of agency by agreement that there are both advantages and disadvantages in different cooperation types. Compared with the external cooperation, the inner cooperation is in favor of reducing the information rent, but acquires more management coordinaton cost. Through the fluctuated pay rate of the project, the inner cooperation can be optimized; through the sign of cooperation contract, the external cooperation without joint investment can be optimized; through information sharing reward, the external cooperation with joint investment can be optimized. Conclusions can be drawn through the dynamical game mode: the profitability of a enterprising venture is the point in the choice of the cooperation type; joint investment helps the incubating ventures to gain more opportunities of investing and financing; it is better to choose partners that are stronger in the complementarity and compatibility; it is advisable to choose a cooperation type according to the information discrepancy of the three sides as well as the marketing mechanism; the incubator should lead the involvement of the cooperation type to make the cooperation transit from the inner to the external.(2) Research on income distribution of trilateral cooperation. The Shapley method is applied to solve the profit distributing problem of the inner trilateral cooperation. First, a one-to-one profit distribution mode of the inner trilateral cooperation is created, then it is spreaded to the many-to-many profit distribution mode of the inner trilateral cooperation to solve the problem of the profit devotion and cost distribution of each side in cooperation. Quadratic programming is applied to solve the income distribution problem in the external cooperation without joint investment, as a result, the distribution rate of the most optimized stock right is defined. A more forward simulating analysis points out that the one that has a larger output elasticity should possess more income, but a moderate concession should be made to maintain the cooperation. With the combination of the above two modes, the income distribution can be made in the external cooperation with joint investment. At last, Through the analysis of the minimum and maximum factors that influencing the income distribution, the main part in distribution and the distributing course, the profit appealing, negotiating and conflict solving mechanism of the profit distribution coordination is concluded.(3) Research on the stock incentive compensation of top management team in business incubator. Th enterprise and public institution both face ethical risk of the top management team's over-investment and in-service consume. The former may not concentrate on the main affairs, while the latter may transfer risk. Aiming at the above two types of technological incubators, two different modes are made, and the optimal investing strategy both of incubator and the incubator top management team is analysed to confirm the most optimized stock rate that is compatible with both the top management team individuals and the incubator. And the mode also proves that the stock right of the top management team can suppress over-investment and in-service consume. The enterprise administrating structure should concentrate on the supervision of disconcentration on the main affair while the public institution should reduce the interfere of the government to suppress the action of transferring risk. A research of the stock incentive mechanism is made, which analyses the incentive aim, the incentive cycling period, the incentive method, the stock increasing mechanism and the change of the incentive scheme as well as the update of the mechanism formula and the terminating procedure. Meanwhile, the law and regulation about the stock right of the incubator top management team and the external supervision are also included in the research rang.