A Study On Diversification Value Of Two Kinds Of Private Listed Company Based On The Different Listing Ways

Private-controlled listed companies have experienced a rapid growth in recent years, and as a result, they have become an important ingredient of Chinese listed companies. Whether the private-controlled listed companies could develop healthily is concerned not only with restart of private enterprises, but also with the healthy development of the domestic capita market. The decentralized equity is the premise of the traditional corporate governance, so the conflicts between shareholders and the management become the focus of concern. But To China's private listed companies, the shareholders of a company are not entirely absence owner. The benefit conflicts not only lie between shareholders and manager but also lie between the ultimate controlling shareholders and small shareholders including creditors.In our country's system under the background of economic transition, due to lack of support system, imperfect on management environment, reference for solving differences between ultimate shareholder and other shareholders from the Anglo-American developed economies, running effect of governance mechanism such as information disclosure and securities trading is not ideal. In this context, with China's private listed companies as a sample, from the view of interest divergence between ultimate shareholders and other shareholder, the study about ultimate shareholders diversification strategy for performance of the company has the important theoretical and practical significance.The irrational diversified investment of the ultimate control in private listed companies has effect not only on minority shareholders and creditors'benefit, but also on the loss of enterprise value as a result of the investment and bankruptcy policy. From the view of financing constraints and diversification faced by ultimate controlling shareholders we start to explain the reasons for the formation of private listed pyramid and agency cost of debt financing, then to analysis negative impact on corporate performance from diversification, pyramid shareholding, asset-liability ratio. The standard for sample selected from pyramid holdings and diversification help us start the research field of diversified encroach.This dissertation reviews the contemporary motivation and performance of diversification, motivation and performance of the pyramid control, agency cost of debt, enterprise merger classical theory and the recent literature, then summarizes the specific issue listed background about listed private enterprise, compare private the equity structure, financial performance, the market value about two kinds of private listed companies, at last analyze behavior of the ultimate controlling shareholders. On the basis of investigation about equity structure of private listed companies in China, we analyze the possible agent behavior of main stakeholders—the ultimate controlling shareholders and creditors and managers in two kinds of private listed companies, and the leading agency cost, then we put forward hypothesis. Finally with 2006-2009 sample of private listed companies we test empirically the agency problem of pyramid shareholding structure, agency problem of debt, the agency cost between large shareholders and small shareholders in diversified investments, and effectively verified theoretical analysis and assumptions. With pyramid shareholding structure the ultimate controllers of private listed companies take actions possibly beneficial to the expense of small investors'benefits. With diversification the ultimate controllers of private listed companies secretly deprive small investors'benefits, in the meantime violate the company's value.This dissertation respectively uses the core financial index and market value index for the corporate value of the proxy variable, also group to carry on the substantial evidence examination of private listed company of ownership of a share structure, diversification behavior and company value. As a result have the stronger consistency. This text according to clue of financial constraints of the ultimate controlling shareholder—making up the pyramid structure—diversified investment-enterprise performance", the research make breakthrough on the field that how the ultimate controlling shareholders constrained by finance will influence the pyramid structure that separate control rights from cash flow rights, and how this kinds of control structure increase agency cost between the large shareholders and small shareholders by diversification, and maximize private benefits, leading to the loss to benefits of small investor and creditor.