| Protectionism is an indispensable part of the United States' foreign trade policy. In this dissertation, two mechanisms are investigated, one is the impact of international trade development on the public preference for protectionism, and the other is the feedback of the America political institutions on the public standpoint. The methodology of this paper is the combination of societal interests' perspective and the special American bureaucratic political decision-making procedure. Still the author develops a new public-congress-administration model to analyze these two questions theoretically, and demonstrates it with the latest cases in the Sino-US trade friction.The core argument is that the common interests among these three variablesengender American protectionism. The public support for protectionism has been wild since the end of the Cold War and the Congress is urged to take activities in this area. The Congress has to respond to such demands in order to ensure their political survival. Therefore, the interaction between the public and the Congress makes protectionism about to explode. Finally the Administration implements the protectionist trade policy because its trade power is endowed by the Congress. So does the American trade policy to China.The extent of inter-industry factor's mobility influences the public trade preferences. According to the economic models that focus on inter-industry factor mobility appropriate, when the factor mobility is relatively high, the owners of the factor of labor will support to raise trade barriers. When the mobility is relatively low, the factors employed in import-competing industries lose in real terms, and hence arises the protectionism. They hope to resolve their problems through political institutions, and the Congress is the critical one. The import-competing industries lobby Congress to defend the U.S. industries. The Congress's responsivity is based on the geographic reach and concentration of the industry.The Congress is the branch that transfers the public idea to the Administration. The complicated and complex structure of the Congress and the open policy-making process provide access for the public to influence the Congress and benefit protectionists. On these conditions, the level of protection in Congress is high. Although the veto points in Congress and the fast track authority lower the voice of Congress, yet the protectionism still comes out.The Administration is the final decisionmaker in the foreign trade policy-making. The preferences of the public and Congress incorporate the President's foreign policy making by stage process together with periods of public attention. At the last stage, protectionism becomes one element of the American trade policy. Administered Protectionism is now prominently affecting trade flows. |