Earthly Foundations Of Freedom

The dissertation is a systematic probe, starting from the promblem of freedom, into Marx's principal text Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right (1843) (CHPR). The paper puts Hegel's philosophy of rights under the philosophical history since modern times, clarifies academically the theoretical backgrounds, and thus reveals that the core theme of his philosophy of rights is to deal with the dillemma caused by modern concept of freedom and to reconstruct the principles of freedom. Thereafter, the paper examines the real motivation of Marx in his writing critique, that is, to discover the inherently theoretical pitfall of dialectic view of freedom expressed in his philosophy of rights, and to search for worldly foundation of and means to real freedom. Around the theme, the paper makes case study on Marx's critique in CHPR of Hegelian dialectic rational thinking, critique of views of state and construction of state power system. The paper also expounds the important effects of CHPR on Marx's new world views. The whole text has four chapters.Chapter One, demonstration of principles of freedom and Hegel's Philosophy of Right. In this chapter, to provide an important historical ideal background for probing into Marx's CHPR, great effort is made to conceptualize Hegel's philosophy of rights and its theme, that is, to comprehend foundamental principles of philosophy (principle of freedom) in his philosophy of rights. Around the topic, the chapter put Hegel's philosophy of rights against the philosophical history since modern times, holding that the real problem consciousness is to deal with the theoretical dillemma of modern concept of freedom– separation between community and individual. To redemonstrate the principles of freedom become the core theme of Hegel's philosophy of rights. Hegelian view of freedom is a dialectic view of freedom, as he adopted the dialectic view of freedom in dealing with the dilemma of and reconstructing of modern views of freedom. According to Habermas, Hegel is the first phiosopher realizing modernity, although not the first of modernity. That is, Hegel not only reflected deeply on modern views of freedom, but also tried to begin with a new philosophical understanding to deal with the prior inherent predicament of modern views of freedom. Hegel's new understanding is the re-demonstration of principle of freedom. Hegel based his freedom view of dialectic rationality on absolute idea, and he intended to construct ethical entity of state through philosophy of rights so as to wipe out paradox and predicament of modern view of freedom.Chapter two, from heaven to earth: pursuit of CHPR for real freedcom.This chapter tries to prove that the pursuit for both real freedom and its basis consists of the core theme of CHPR. In Marx's own words, he wrote critique in order to solve those troublemaking questions, because he had been a Hegelianist before he wrote CHPR, believing dialectic principle of freedom, while social reality proved to him that legal relations originated from relations of material interests instead of dialectic rational view of freedom. The intense relation between freedom view of dialectic rationality and worldly material interest encouraged Marx to write CHPR. In CHPR, Marx criticized in large proportion the dialectic rational way of thinking and the freedom view it represented, which is a inevitabe phase in sorting the philosophical relations between him and Hegel and establishing his own philosophy. Marx's criticism on"heaven"thinking way can be seen from: first, he regarded that the dialectic rational way of thinking is a heavenly way; second, he held that state was an illusory community constructed in the dialectic rational way of thinking. In Marx's opinion, state had no the free function as attributed by Hegel's philosophy of rights, but state as well as civil society, both being the form of community for human existence, is determined by civil society. In some terms, Marx's CHPR is to invalidate the legend of state of dialectic philosophy of rights. Chapter three, paradoxical freedom: critique of CHPR on Hegelian design of state power system. This chapter focuses on discussion about Marx's critique of the state power system that Hegel advocated,"crown- executive- legislative". Marx held that Hegelian state power system was only a reform of such feudal power systems as hereditary succession and primogeniture, on the basis of abstract logical powers, which were impossible to put into full effects the"idea of freedom"supported by capitalist class, thus a paradoxical view of freedom. The chapter begins with Marx's critique of the power of crown. In Marx's opinion, crown is abitrary and illusory existence, and Hegelian reconstruction of state power system is the need of inherent development of dialectic logics. Marx's critique on Hegelian crown demonstrates that the power of crown advocated by dialectic philosophy of rights can not fulfil real freedom (only protects private property), and it, because of arbitrariness of autocrat, may cancel randomly established laws, and even constitution. In such institutions, freedom is the illusory existence of"spirit", just as its heavenly foundation of views of philosophy of rights. Dialecitc philosophy, starting from the illusory idea of"abstract state", hold that the power of executive is one part of objective aspects that make up of the inherent sovereignty of autocrat, is a particular"national"function that autocracy attributed to bereaucracy. Therefore, dialectic executive power in reality becomes the bureaucratic politics of"state formalism", fails to take over the"reponsibility"of eliminating the controversy between state and civil society, and just as power of crown, has no worldly foundation. However, as legislature usually refers to the process of individuals with power or institutions affirmed by law to consciously make or change laws, a reflection of"freedom", Marx criticized the Hegel's paradox of the theory of legislative power and freedom at great length. According to Marx, legislative power, from the perspective of dialectic philosophy of rights, is fundamentally not a real state power, but a derivative of state institutions, acting as complement of executive power and hoping to get real freedom from illusory power. The crown-dominated power system of dialectic philosophy of rights that Hegel constructed can not eliminate contradiction (separation) between individuals and social community, furthermore, it would cast the heavenly dust on the hope of freedom in the history of thoughts.Chapter four, CHPR and Marx's new worldview. The task of this chapter is to examine the inherent correlation between CHPR and Marx's new worldview, from the perspecitves of relation between CHPR and human liberation of Marx, and of relation between critical theory of civil society and practical re-orientation. The chapter discusses the following questions. Human liberation, the lifelong philosophical pursuit of Marx, is in accordance with worldly freedom expounded in CHPR. Marx lived in a time when capitalism governed and evolved, and scholars representing capitalist interests were the main stream. The freedom they advocated was a political freedom relatively in term of of religious freedom, a secularism political liberation of bourgeois who kicked religion out of politics. However, Marx held that the freedom these thinkers initiated was illusory freedom, was spititual and heavenly life, that is, plitical liberation was only stylistic freedom and thus incomplete freedom. According to Marx, worldly life is material, real and humane life, only in which can human fulfil real freedom and acquire complete liberation. Critique of CHPR on civil society commenced Marx's further examination of civil society of its principles, being significant in his formation of historical materialsim. Through the efforts of many philosophers ever since Marx, especially that of Heidegger, Gadamer, modern pragmatic philosophy has evolved a grand philosophic scene, which is impossible to be separated from Marx's critique on dialectic rationality. Marx, in his critique, not only succeeded in overstepping philosophy of consciousness, but established an extential philosophy that puts emphasis on aesthetic life and guides reformation in worldly life.