| In this thesis, the author discusses mainly on three issues: how does the non-performance loan ("NPL") of state-owned banks come into being? What is the system source of such problem, and what is the effect of the measures taken by the government regarding the same? By political, economic, legal, comparative and historical analysis method, the author observes here from various angles the formation of NPL in the state-owned bank system so as to try to disclose the process of the NPL's formation as well as the system source of the same. The core point of view of this thesis is that the formation of the state-owned banks' NPL is: (1) the result of the game played by groups of various interests in the existing system during the period of transition; (2) the historical cost of our country's reform; and (3) the accumulation of our country's risk in politics, economy and social system structure.In the part of foreword, the author points out the gravity of NPL problem and introduces the overall train of thought, method and origins of thought of his research.In Chapter one, the author outlines the introduction and the analysis of NPL, describes the current situation, distribution and formation process of the state-owned banks' NPL and points out the major factors that influence the formation process of NPL.In Chapter two, the author discusses on the relations between the loss incurred in state-owned enterprises and the formation of the state-owned banks' NPL. Firstly, the author points out that there exists the close relation of financing between state-owned banks and state-owned enterprises. Soon afterwards, the author analyzes the loss incurred in state-owned enterprises and points out the character of the state-owned enterprises' operation, i.e. at the same time of suffering constantly loss, they enlarge constantly their assets scale. Such operation character is related to the soft budget restriction existing between the government and state-owned enterprises, and the government's interference in the state-owned banks makes such soft budget restriction transfer to the field of credit. It consequently leads to the situation that state-owned banks provide constantly finance to the state-owned enterprises suffering loss. Regarding the process of the state-owned enterprises' loss's turning into the state-owned banks' NPL, the author analyzes the game played by groups of various interests. Then, the author points out that the conflict of interest between the central government andlocal governments, which is caused by the authority division, is one of the reasons for why local governments interfere in the operation of state-owned banks. In addition, the author analyzes the reverse coercion system of the soft budget restriction and points out that the collective action taken by state-owned enterprises once coerce banks into providing them the credit.In Chapter three, the author analyzes that the enterprises' credit problem and the soft debt restriction lead to the difficult position of relations between banks and enterprises. The author points out the impact produced by enterprises' ownership arrangement and legal system on the relations between banks and enterprises. The author thinks that a creditor oriented relation between banks and enterprises should be set up.In Chapter four, from aspects of the credit scale control as well as the development and reorganization of trust investment companies, the author discusses on the influence of periodical .economic fluctuation on the formation of NPL. The author analyzes the period of investment enlargement-inflation-governance and reorganization, which appears constantly in our country's economy, then points out that such periodical economic fluctuation is originated in the interior investment enlargement impulse of state-owned enterprises and local governments. With such investment enlargement impulse, the period of investment enlargement-infiation-governance and reorganization appears constantly in our country's economy. During such a period, the funds fr... |
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