| The game of corporate interest parts is a theoretical problem that has attracted the attention of many economists. In a joint-stock company, there are both agreement and difference between the major shareholder's objective and the company's objective. If the regulate system is incomplete or insufficient, the major shareholder can take advantage of his control power over the company to gain private interests. As for a listed company, there are more and more shareholders. Accordingly, the interests game among its shareholders becomes more and more complex. As a result, the interests game among the listed company's shareholders has become a key issue of modem enterprise theory. This dissertation is primarily concerned with the right abuse problem of the major shareholder, especially in the listed company. The author attempts to develop a theoretical framework to analyze this problem.In the theoretical part, the author first gives a definition of the major shareholder's right abuse, then focuses on several models of rights abuse, including:1. The model of the major shareholder's right abuse under controlled structure.This model includes two sub-models: the right abuse model of profit transfer and the right abuse model of cost shifting. The basic conclusion is as follows: Through right abuse, the controlling shareholder transfers the publicly-traded profit of the firm, while the interests of minorities, creditors and employees are seriously harmed. The two types of right abuse of the major shareholder will expand the output of the industry, reduce the product price and the total profit of the industry, in which process, consumers will gain the welfare of price falling down.2. The model of the major shareholder's right abuse under the controlling minority structure As for this model, the present study first investigates the separation of ownership and controlof several typical types of CMS enterprises, including: firms deviating from one-share-one-vote principle, pyramiding corporate structure and cross holding structure. Then several simple models are made to analyze the efficient loss of project choice, decision on scope and control right transfer in the CMS corporate, when the major shareholder abuses his rights. Through these analyses and the comparison with LCS corporate, we can see the inferiority of CMS firm's corporate governance.3. The model of minorities supervising the major shareholderIn this model, the author uses game theory to build a complete information static game model to analyze the characteristics of minorities' supervising the major shareholder. The following conclusion is drawn: In the case of dispersed shares, the supervisory amount provided by the minorities will be far bellow that of Pareto dominance. The higher the dispersion degree, the less the supervision provided by the minorities. And as long as the minorities' supervisory supply is insufficient, the possibility of the major shareholder's abusing his rights always exists.4. The game model of supervisor regulating major shareholderIn this model, the author uses maximum theory and game theory to analyze the regulating characteristics of the supervisor. The conclusion is that the intensity of supervision depends on a series of factors: the stricter the punish, the less the loss made by right abuse, the lower the supervisory cost, the lower the supervisory frequency needed. Moreover, the author discusses the rent-seeking model of the major shareholders' colluding with the supervisors.5. The model on the relationship between investor protection and corporate externalfinancing.The author introduces several theoretical models of the relationship between shareholder protection and corporate external financing proposed by Rafeal La Porta. The conclusion is that good investor protection leads to higher Tobin's Q ratio, higher sales growth percentage and higher corporate valuation, hi addition, the better the investors are protected, the more money can be raised and the larger will the firm be.Part Two is focu...
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