Research On US Postwar Diplomatic Policy To Indonesia And Covert Action (1945-1966)

The starting point of US postwar diplomatic policy to Indonesia was toforce it work for and abide by the containment strategy of US, since its peculiar location,rich strategic resources and mass population were what the US was seeking to covert itinto an "anti-communism bridgehead in Asia". After the Second World War, Sukaronadministration (1945-1966) intended to create an intermediate region between thewestern and eastern camps, which, on one hand, demonstrated the instinctive reaction ofthe long oppressed country, and on the other hand, embodied the realistic politicalviews.The ideological trend of Sukaron administration went along with the changing USpolicy, which is best explained by the Indonesia revolution. When Indonesian appeal forindependence destroyed the alliance between US and Deutschland, the Trumanadministration chose to remain silent. However, when the cold war broke out,communism became the enemy of US ideology, and Sukaron administration turnedagainst the left-wing in the Madiun Rebellion, the US turned to support Indonesianindependence; for it believed that an anti-communist independent state could bring backrich political return.However, the US couldn't understand how Indonesia cherished and longed forsovereignty and territorial integrity. US neutral attitude toward West Irian ruined thepossibility of intimacy between US and Indonesia, which in turn rendered uselessEisenhower's effort to involve Indonesia into the western camp.Since Indonesian neutral diplomatic policy was the natural result of tradition and reality,then how to reverse the tide in Indonesia? What aim did the US intend to achieve? Theanswer lies in the first document of the US foreign policy to Indonesia—NSC5518,which said the ultimate aim was to turn Indonesia against communism and construct astable and pro-western government. This document set the tune of the policy towardIndonesia for the following governments.During the process, due to the confrontation between the eastern and westerncamps, the US had to worry about its limited military and diplomatic approaches.However, a series of covert actions plotted by CIA in Iran and Guatemala tempted the US to copy such actions in Indonesia.Eventually, the rebellion in the outer island during 1956-1958 offered opportunity forCIA to practice such actions to influence Indonesian politics. CIA supported the rebelssecretly and finally caused the Indonesian civil war. Because of the poor militarycapability of the rebels and the insufficient finance support from the US, the covertactions failed in the end. Such failure clearly demonstrated the confusion of Eisenhoweradministration's foreign policy to Indonesia.But soon Eisenhower realized his lack of patience and observation. From 1958,Eisenhower modified his policy, tolerated Sukaron and his neutralism, set upanti-communism as a long-term goal and defined the army as its new anti-communismagent. This policy was represented in the NSC5901 and NSC6023 respectively. To mendthe chasm between them, the Kennedy administration resumed the aids to Indonesia. Inthe early 1960s, the tension between the two states relaxed and the Kennedyadministration contributed constructively to the solution of West Irian problem.In the mid 1960s, as the domestic and external conflicts of Indonesia tensed,Untung coup broke out in the army, which finally opened the Pandora's Box ofIndonesian social and political conflicts, and meanwhile, offered a chance to mend thedeteriorating US-Indonesia relation which was damaged by the dispute betweenIndonesia and Malaysia. After Untung was suppressed, the US realized that the newarmy group led by Suharto was likely to take the power in the future. As a result, CIAcombined with other departments launched a new round of covert actions againstIndonesia, offering aids to the new army, and promoting the new army to slaughter thecommunist party. Later with the help of the US, Suharto disgraced Sukaron andeventually seized the power. Thus US-Indonesia relation entered a new era ofcomprehensive alliance and the US finally achieved its long-term target inIndonesia—to establish a non-communist and pro-western administration. Therefore,from the above analysis, we can safely draw the conclusion that the third option—covertaction, which was beyond war and diplomacy, played an important role in this period.