Referential Identity And Necessity

This dissertation mainly discusses the referential identity and necessity. It also analyzes the real meaning of what is the identity. The author tries to put forward a make-sense answer to the question of how to fix the object by words.The first chapter is about Kripke's object to the theory of descriptions. A word or phrase means what it stands for or refers to, This was mill's view for naming expressions. Frege saw a difficulty for the theory of meaning for naming expressions if the meaning of such an expression is simply the object named and introduce a distinction between the sense and the reference. The referent of a naming expression is that item that is uniquely characterized by the sense of the expression. Russell realized that naming expressions could sometimes fail to name anything. Russell thought that if a sentence did not express a proposition then that Sentence had to be nonsense. His answer was a theory of descriptions based on the idea of logical analysis. Russell's analysis can Solve Frege's problem without the introduction of sense. But one problem with the description theory by Frege and Russell is that according to that view each use of name has a single description associated with it. Wittgenstein and Searle use the cluster of descriptions to solve the problem. Kripke is against contingence of the theory of description.The second and the third chapter are the main body of the dissertation. The first part is about Kripke's rejections to descriptivism, arguing that it is based on a number of faulty presuppositions. We can roughly group the objections into three categries:1. modal arguments—according to kripke, the description theory of names gets the modal facts wrong. The theory holds that the meaning of the name N is given by the properties in the associated cluster Q. He points out that many of properties that we commonly associate with people are properties that are not essential to the person. Kripke introduced the notion of rigid designator/non- rigid designator to help clarify the different ways that we may use expressions. 2.epistemic arguments-According to the description theory, one of the properties or some collection of the properties in Q is believed by the speaker to designate someone uniquely. Kripke points out that we often use names to refer to certain persons without believing that we have unique descriptions of those persons. 3. semantic arguments. Kripke's basic idea is simple. A given use u of a proper name N refers to a given entity X Provided two conditions obtain: (a) at some time X was baptized N, and (b) there is a chain of reference-dependent uses of N leading from u to the baptism. And then the general name is the same as proper name. And the essence of the proper name and general name depend on the individual and the deep structure. Therefore his distinction between necessity a posteriori and contingent a posteriori dose make sense. Kripke's puzzle can not be solved by descriptivism. It will be solved by analyzing the essence of belief.Finally we hold that Aristotle's essentialism is the base of Kripke's theory. And after dialectically analyzing the identity we try to advance a new frame of reference, in order to end up the dilemma of the same and the difference of identity.