Development And Platform Ecosystem Selfregulation Of Digital Content Industry In China

With the development of Internet, especially the application of digital technology promote and revolve the development of digital content industry. The digitalization of content industry is not only the transformation and upgrading of product, but also the change of business model and consumer proposition. In the digital age, content industry development model is platform, the platform uses free sample product to appeal to consumers, than earn profits by value-added product, derivatives and advertisement, this means that content is king. It is convenient for dissemination of content product by internet, this is important to content, first, this paper describes the occurrence and significance of this change by overview and panoramic display.Science and technology is a two-blade sword, traditional regulation doesn’t suit the huge amount information on the internet, in the era of revolutionary change of content industry, only depend on government regulation can not adequate the development of digital content industry which developing mode is platform.The effectiveness, freedom, incentive, low cost and so on of self-regulation make up for the market and government failure, the "soft" features of self-regulation fit the country governance, it means that the right of government go back to market, moreover, the social welfare in the self-regulation is high than government regulation. So the self-regulation system which core is platform enterprise come into the world.In the reconstitution of self-regulation system based on platform enterprise, first, this paper states the mechanism and path of enterprises grow up to platform to platform ecosystem, firms grow into platforms depend on the core product or service, however, platforms become into platform ecosystem due to the network externality. The growth process of enterprises grow into platform to platform ecosystem, not only the changes of the organizational structure, but also is the change of business model from single win to multi-win to win-win, in the meanwhile it is the main model in the platform economic era.Based on the work mentioned above, it builds the system of self-regulation include law cost, legal indeterminacy and so on,then we use the model to explain the welfare of the system of the government regulation and self-regulation. We find that under the system of government regulation, the government regulation policies are more beneficial for consumers and government revenue. But under the system of self-regulation, government revenue is more than the system of self-regulation when the uncertainty of the legal is greater, and the greater the consumer influence the government, the high level of the social welfare will be. The adjustment costs of the law decide which one is suitable for the regulation system of the digital content industry. Obviously, the advantages of self-regulation, such as the flexibility, illustrate its adjustment cost is lower than the government regulation. This means that the self-regulation is better than the government regulation for the regulation of digital content industry.In order to explain the mechanism of self-regulation, it establishes the self-regulation frame involved government, operators, providers and consumers to exam the incentives and equilibrium. The results showed that:Operators as regulator, if the probability exposed the providers’fraud increased, the providers need to promise more bribes to operators, however, it reduced the probability of collusive. The complaint cost reduced of consumer can decrease the slush fund, but raised the probability of collusive to be found. In the collusive equilibrium, vigilance is high than exposure equilibrium, but operators have lower marginal incentives to commit fraud, high level of fraud not only due to the lower vigilance, but also depend on the slush fund.Finally, it analyses the influence of competition in the structure of monopoly and oligopoly market, consumers diverse and self-regulation to the operators’strategy and pricing based on mathematical model. Then got the conclusions:Competition can reduce the price of digital content products and increase the degree of specialization. The operator’s deviation which is depend on the span of consumer preference is low when they faced rational heterogeneous biased consumers not homogeneous, then the price of digital content products is higher than homogeneous. The deviation is bigger when the digital content operators carried the responsibility of regulation than not, meanwhile the price of digital content products is higher.