Research On False Failure Returns Network Equilibrium Models

As consumption awareness and buying pattern change, more and more products are bought by people, and large purchases are accompanied by the increasing false failure returns. Many companies decide that false failure returns are handled by the third party logistics, in order to develop the core competitiveness and offer consumers a more specialized service. Therefore, the third party logistics dealing with false failure returns are studied in this article.This dissertation constructs three equilibrium models for the third party logistics dealing with false failure returns after identifying the concepts of false failure returns, and third party reverse logistics. The main work includes the following aspect:(1) Because uncertain demands of market bring huge losses to the enterprise, this paper constructs an equilibrium model in which the third party logistics are in charge of distribution under the assumption that the market demand is a random variable. The model defines behavioral characteristics of different participants, establishes the objective function for different decision makers, and discusses the equilibrium conditions of the network. A numerical example shows that:the more the satisfaction, the less the false failure returns, the higher the sales price.(2) The life cycle of some products is short, although they can be resold after being processed, the price often has changed. This paper establishes an equilibrium model in which the third party logistics are in charge of reselling. The model discusses the optimal strategies of different decision makers, gets the profits distribution mechanism among the members. A numerical example shows that:if the manufacturers improve the weight of special services, the false failure returns of markets will reduce, the sales price will increase.(3) Due to the waste products have high reuse values, and the enterprises must undertake a certain environmental responsibility, this dissertation develops an equilibrium model in which the third party logistics are in charge of treating the waste products. The model characterizes the competitions and games between the decision makers, discusses the optimal conditions of decision makers in each layer. A numerical example shows that:with the increasing of government incentives, the number of recyclables increases, the amount of the false failure returns declines, and the price of new commodities decreases.