Research On Multi-Attribute Bidding Mechanism Of The Third Supervision Party Of Medical Insurance Fund

At present,the weak administrative supervision force of medical insurance fund in China and various policies issued by the country all point to vigorously explore the use of third-party supervision system of medical insurance fund.The implementation of the third-party supervision system faces the following two problems.First,under the asymmetric information,the supervision rights of the medical insurance fund cannot be effectively allocated,and it is difficult to select the supervisor with the highest management technology type and the maximum social surplus.The second is the absence of direct benefit victims of medical insurance fund waste,and the lack of incentive mechanism that can balance the interests of both parties(regulators and governments).In order to solve the above problems,this paper combines the multi-attribute bidding auction model with the bidding problem of the third supervision party of the medical insurance fund,and designs a multi-attribute bidding model for the quality of the medical insurance in advance under the condition of asymmetric information.The main work of this paper is as follows.Firstly,it introduces the third-party supervision system of basic medical insurance fund in China and its implementation status,and analyzes some problems existing in the implementation of the third-party supervision system of medical insurance fund.Secondly design the bidder bidding of expected service quality supervision after the medical insurance fund under the system of bidding based model,obtain the equilibrium bidding mechanism of the model,including the optimal allocation rules and balance of the tender offer,and in the numerical example is given,under the asymmetric information of medical insurance fund supervision for effective configuration.Finally,in the case of the medical insurance fund prepayment system,the bidding model of the bidder to the expected regulatory service quality and the prepayment of the medical insurance fund is designed,the equilibrium solution of the model and the optimal bidding mechanism are obtained,and the calculation example analysis is given to verify the feasibility of the model.The model not only effectively allocates the regulatory rights of the medical insurance fund under the asymmetric information,but also can motivate the winning bidder to make efforts to reduce the waste of the fund.The results show that under the multi-attribute bidding mechanism of post-payment system and prepayment system,the optimal model can effectively identify the management technology types of the bidders,that is,only the bidders with the best management technology types can eventually become the third supervisor of the medical insurance fund.The winning bidder can achieve the highest expected regulatory service quality and create the highest social surplus with the least medical insurance fund.In equilibrium,the amount of fund advance is negatively correlated with the expected quality of regulatory service,which means that when the bidder deliberately exaggerates the expected quality of regulatory service when bidding,the risk of fund overspending will increase,and the risk of fund overspending will be completely borne by the bidder,resulting in a large loss.Therefore,the bidding mechanism designed in this paper can ensure that the bidder will tell the truth about the expected regulatory service quality bidding with unverifiable attributes in advance.On the other hand,the winning bidder will strive for supervision to reduce fund waste in the later stage,which can also be seen as an implicit incentive for supervision.