Research On Multi-agent Cooperative Operation Decision Of Market-oriented Health Risk Assessment Service

With the prominent problems of population aging and sub-health in China,"healthy China" has become a national strategy.The realization of "Healthy China" focuses on preventive health care and health promotion,and guides the transformation of people’s health concept from passive medical treatment to health management centering on the strategic goal of "getting sick less,getting sick later and being healthier".Health risk assessment is the important link in the process of health management,through the collection of personal health information,using technology to predict individual occur at a certain time in a particular disease or because of the possibility of a particular disease causes death,and accordingly provide targeted control and intervention,with the least amount of cost to achieve maximum health.The supply of health risk assessment services needs the coordination of multiple agents.market-oriented health risk assessment Service need the coordination of service technology providers and service operators,as well as the participation of third-party investment institutions in the absence of start-up capital.The conflict of interest among multiple agents of health risk assessment service leads to the difficulty of collaborative operation.Therefore,exploring how to use contract design to achieve the collaborative operation among multiple agents of different market-oriented health risk assessment service is the main research issue of this paper.Based on relationship analysis of health risk assessment service multiple agents,considering the profit driven behavior existing in the different service market-oriented health risk assessment operation,profit distribution contract design considers incentive mechanism.The different game models of the service operator as the principal,service technology supplier as the agent and the third-party investment organization as the principal,service technology supplier and service operator as the agent are constructed,and then optimal decision-making of multiple agents in the different situations is provided.Furthermore,the influence of technological innovation ability and effort cost coefficient on the optimal effort level and profit distribution decision is analyzed.The research draws the following conclusions: Designing profit distribution contract with incentive mechanism is conducive to alleviate the speculation problem caused by profit-driven behavior,and improve the profit of the principal.During different market-oriented health risk assessment service operation,the principal shall motivate the service technology suppliers to improve the innovation ability coefficient and the service operators to improve the promotion and operation ability coefficient,so as to help reduce the effort cost coefficient,which is conducive to improving the overall profit of coordinated operation and the principal’s profit.The multi-agent cooperative operation of market-oriented health risk assessment service lays a foundation for the sustainable development of health risk assessment service,helps to improve the relevant theories and methods of multi-agent cooperative operation,and has important guideline value for health risk assessment service development.