Research On Study On The Regulation Of Doctor’s Salary

China has carried out market-oriented reform of the economic system,since the 1980 s.So far,it has established a relatively mature socialist market economy system.Compared with other markets,the reform of medical service market lags behind.The medical service market is a special market that affects the life of the whole people.If the market mechanism is used simply,the cost of obtaining information and services for patients will increase.It is impossible to accurately judge the behavior of doctors through the information and get high-quality service.In this case,doctors are dominant in the medical services market and patients can only choose to accept or refuse treatment.Therefore,the government is considered as an important institution to control the medical service market,and price regulation is considered as an important means to control medical expenses and doctors’ behavior.In the process of medical system reform,the salary level and salary structure of doctors are measured and formulated again.However,there are still some problems in the measurement of human capital value,price level,salary structure,incentive mechanism and so on.On the one hand,the reasonable salary level of doctors can make the best allocation of resources and give full play to human capital.On that other hand,the invention can promote the healthy operation of the medical service market,reduce the occurrence of doctor profit-making and negative diagnosis and treatment in the medical service market,and improve the service quality of doctors and the satisfaction degree of patient.Therefore,the doctor’s salary is an important part of the medical service market,guiding the direction of the medical service market.Based on the above background,this paper makes a systematic study on the salary regulation of doctors in public hospitals in China.Based on the theory of rent dissipation,using the theory of property rights and price regulation,this paper analyzes the problems of doctors’ behavior distortion and patients’ treatment process in public hospitals.This article is divided into six chapters: Chapter One and chapter Two,mainly including raising questions,defining concepts,theoretical basis,basic framework,basic methods;The third chapter,mainly expounds the background of the implementation of domestic doctor pay regulation and the implementation of the doctor pay system;The fourth chapter,combining with the theory of property right economics,comes to the conclusion that the rent value dissipation is formed due to the unreasonable salary level and structure.Doctors and patients in order to grab wealth to appear the above problems;The fifth chapter,draw lessons from different countries and regions of the doctor’s salary level and structure,general experience;Chapter Six,from the point of view of price regulation,incentive and constraint,puts forward the governance scheme.In order to promote the reform of medical compensation regulation,ease the tension between doctors and patients in the medical service market,and avoid the distortion of doctors’ behavior in the process of diagnosis and treatment.The research methods of this article are literature research method,property right economics research method and contrast method.The innovation is to use the theory of rent dissipation and property rights in institutional economics to analyze the causes of the problems caused by the regulation of doctors’ remuneration,and to propose an improved scheme based on the incentive mechanism model.