| An important reason, which will cause modern credit risks, is asymmetric information. In the credit market, the credit funds movement procedure of the commercial bank mainly involves two main bodies, the bank and the enterprise. In the transaction process, the enterprise is the fund user, who has full information about the income and risks of the actual investment project, which has borrowed funds. So the enterprise has the superiority in information. In order to gain the capital the investment needs, the enterprise is easy to create behavior dissimilation in the capital operation procedure. Behavior dissimilation of the enterprise makes the commercial bank unable to access to information promptly, accurately and comprehensively and unable to make reliable judgments for the credit quality and the probability to repay the loan of the borrower. Thus there exists the possibility that policy-making faults cause credit loses, as is the hidden trouble for financial crises. Obviously, how to exploit the way to diminish financial crises and establish a reasonable credit policy-making mechanism theoretically and practically is urgent and vital in Chinese finance world. Based on the above, some correlation theories of economics of information and game theory are used to probe into the avoidance and evasion of credit risks in this paper.There are altogether five parts. The first part of the paper is introduction. In this part, background and significance of the selected topic, history evolution of the information economic theory, as well as current domestic and foreign research situation on information asymmetry are elaborated; In the second part, the generation, classification and domestic and foreign definition method of credit risks in the commercial bank are studied. Some correlation theories of economics of information and game theory are briefly expounded. By the construction and analysis of two gambling models, adverse selection and moral hazard caused by information asymmetry as well as the low efficiency in the credit market are also studied from a new point of view; In the third part, credit of the commercial bank is divided into common credit and risk credit. According to their different characteristics, different information screening models are set Namely, in order to solve the adverse selection which information asymmetry initiates, multi-stage connected contract of the common credit and control right transfer contract of the risk credit are separately proposed; In the fourth part, the avoidance of moral hazard is thoroughly discussed, the supervisionmodel to avoid moral hazard is established, the gambling condition of the commercial bank and the borrower is analyzed according to two kinds of situations, the complete information and the incomplete information, their balanced solutions are separately produced, the most superior strategy for the commercial bank to supervise and inspect the loan enterprises is proposed theoretically and tested according to Chinese situation; In the last part, how to avoid credit risks effectively and operate the credit property using the information asymmetric theory are mainly elaborated.The innovation of this paper lies in applying correlation theories of economics of information to research on credit risks. By the establishment and analysis of the gambling model, effective exploration to the credit risk is theoretically made. From the commercial bank's angle, the most superior strategies of credit of the commercial bank and the borrower are analyzed. The result will help the commercial bank to avoid financial credit risks and improve the credit funds quality... |
PDF Full Text Request