THE RIGHT TO KNOW: HAZARD INFORMATION AND THE CONTROL OF OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH RISKS

This study explores worker efforts to acquire and use information about occupational health hazards. Although labor, industry, and government all agree that workers should know about hazards, there is no consensus about what they should know and how they should be informed. In response to difficulties in obtaining information from employers, workers have successfully lobbied for state and local laws and federal regulations, most of which requires employers to respond to worker requests. Based on eight case studies of workers exposed to chemical hazards, I examine the influences affecting worker demand for hazard data, their actions in response to acquiring information, and their success in reducing exposures to toxic substances.; Hazard information is available from diverse sources. I contend that workers who perceive that change in the conditions of risk is possible are likely to seek information. Which sources workers use depends on the costs of inquiry, potential harassment or discrimination, willingness of sources to explain complex technical information, trustworthiness, and personal relationships.; My analysis of the cases and interviews suggests that effective use of information often depends on the collective solidarity and militancy of the workforce and management attitudes. Workers acting alone rarely are able to convince management to reduce hazardous exposures. Collective action tends to be more effective, especially when a union represents workers. However, it is very difficult for workers individually and collectively to gain a share of power in workplace decisions over general working conditions.; Right-to-know laws and regulations which rely on worker activism rather than mandatory training provide a legal mechanism for obtaining information, but do not lead to a uniform improvement in knowledge, nor necessarily to better labor-management relations. My analysis of current information policies and the case studies suggests that it would be better to provide information about workplace hazards through mandatory training programs, increased use of nonemployer organizations to provide education, and restrictions on trade secrets. In addition, workers could use information more effectively if opportunities to participate in health and safety decisions were increased.