Research On Cooperative Game And Agent Channel Coordination Mechanism In Telecommunication Enterprises

The arrival of the business telecom companies and 4G era, which confirmed the previous original industrial pattern and control of the situation, brings with it new problems that may directly affect telecom operator competitiveness. Such issues relate to both whole business and multi-dimensional competition; they challenge the entire business operation of the traditional value chain operators and they impact on the value of triple play operators and other issues. Within this new competitive situation, how telecom companies respond to these new changes and how they co-operate effectively and compete with one another, are both issues which lack systematic theoretical direction. The previous twosome or one-dimensional model of the game under the new telecommunications market no longer has practical significance in this new pattern; therefore, systematic thinking and in-depth research into this problem is an important issue to be solved by academics, entrepreneurs, experts and scholars.On the basis of a comprehensive analysis of relevant research results (both domestic and abroad), this article is performed based on a number of theories, such as cooperative competition theory, complex systems theory for telecommunications, game, theory, and supply chain coordiantion. These are chosen according to mathematical models and data facts, systematic research, game multilateral issues, three-dimensional dynamic game between telecom companies. Aiming to the results of game among telecom companies, the telecom company and its agent channels in all business operations are researched in detail. The main idea of this research work is as follows.Based on the fuzzy-WINGS (Weighted influence non-linear gauge system) method, the competitiveness of Chinese telecom companies has been analyzed in-depth, identifying systemic factors of competing companies. The most important iuuse was noted in relation to the telecom companies, i.e., completion and cooperation between telecom companies.With the most important issue considered, to recreate the reality of the three telecom enterprises’ oligopoly competition, a three-dimensional game model was constructed, in order to research dynamic game behavior in the three telecom operators from the price of product and service in three dimensions. The results showed that Telecom, China Mobile and China Unicom (the three competing oligarchs in the whole 4G era business market) should be continuously developing new business, providing more quality services, and they should abandon the rate war. The three operators should be party to extensive healthy competition and cooperation. The effectiveness of the communication network and the effectiveness of system emerge can be full played to improve their economies of scale.The competitive game model of the telecom companies, which is based on the patulous Cournot model, was designed. The model showed that for the same company, if it only has just one single product and participants participate in a multiple game, the Nash equilibrium only related to the price and cost of product; however, if it has different products, and there are on multiple participants, the Nash equilibrium did not only relate to the price and cost of the product, but also with the influence co-efficient between the products concerned. In the case of only a single product with the participants participating in a multiple game, the Nash equilibrium solution was less than the Nash equilibrium in the same enterprise that had multiple differentiated products.The channels comprised telecom operators and telecom agents. The application of dynamic game theory was established by the telecom agent channel in a centralized decision-making model. The business model, the business into the contract, and the effort in the cost-sharing model was based on the combined contract. The model demonstrates that the traditional contract based on business, could not make the channels co-ordinate. Given the rate of the business separation, the rate of sharing cost, and the proposed telecoms agency channel, the Pareto improvement of transfer payments mechanism. The results showed that when the business enters into a contract where the parameters are equal to (ⅰ) telecom operators’ business unit operating costs divided by its agents and telecoms costs of marketing and business units, and (ⅱ) the effort cost-sharing contract parameters with telecom operators in addition to its business operations’unit costs and unit operating costs at telecom sales agents is equal, the telecom agents can achieve coordinated channels. This is combined with the proposed payment mechanism telecom agents transferred to telecom operators. This telecom agent channels achieved a Pareto improvement. Finally, the analysis of numerical examples can be demonstrated by the effectiveness of the proposed coordination contract.Channels of the telecom business agent and the problem of a lack of reward by two traditional, encourage contracts to be brokered based on business and based on reward; given this, the agent can lack the enthusiasm to improve service quality of service. It is thereby proposed to form an incentive mechanism that is based on sharing service cost by using dynamic game theory, to establish a model based on business and reward. By solving and undertaking comparative analysis of the model, it showed that with a cost-sharing contract, the service contract parameters model provided a significant increase in profits, compared to the system and service level within the range given under the traditional incentive model. The study results demonstrated the incentive effectiveness of the service cost-sharing contract model for the telecoms business agent.