New Product Pricing And Quality Disclosure For Companies Considerin Consumer Behavior

As an important strategy for modernization,quality improvement has become one of the key tasks.The new product market has the dynamic characteristic of information asymmetry stage,the new product quality information usually appears two development stages of initial information asymmetry and later information symmetry.Moreover,consumer behavior in the new product market is diverse,and short-sighted consumers and strategic consumers are common.In this context,the disclosure of new product quality information has become a key topic of concern for government regulation,corporate marketing,and corporate R&D.This thesis analyzes the optimal pricing decisions and optimal profits of firms under mandatory quality disclosure and spontaneous quality disclosure by constructing a twoperiod full information dynamic game model and a non-full information dynamic game model consisting of firms and consumers,considering short-sighted consumers and strategic consumers,respectively,and explores the impact of consumers’ strategic behavior on firms’ and consumers’ purchase timing.In addition,this thesis also investigates the quality disclosure preferences of firms and strategic consumers through comparative analysis and analyzes the optimal choice of quality disclosure model starting from social welfare maximization.It is found that(1)in the spontaneous disclosure model,high-quality firms are always disadvantaged either by distorting pricing upward to prevent low-quality firms from faking upward in the separation equilibrium or by failing to reveal product quality levels to consumers in the conflation equilibrium.(2)Consumers’ strategic behavior expands the threshold of effective spontaneous quality disclosure.The presence of strategic consumer behavior can prompt firms to decide on different initial prices and help strategic consumers to infer product quality levels,making market-driven spontaneous quality disclosure more effective.(3)Firms’ preferences for quality disclosure models depend on the high or low level of product quality,with high quality firms preferring mandatory quality disclosure models and low quality firms preferring spontaneous quality disclosure models.(4)Although the mandatory disclosure model eliminates information asymmetry and stimulates consumers’ willingness to purchase,it does not always benefit consumers.(5)The mandatory quality disclosure model is not only the optimal disclosure model from the perspective of expected social welfare,but also the most beneficial disclosure model for society as a whole,regardless of the specific circumstances of product quality improvement of enterprises.Based on the existing theoretical studies and the relevant findings of this thesis,the following insights are provided to promote new product market governance and information disclosure regulation.(1)The higher the product quality,the more enterprises should actively disclose quality information to avoid profit loss caused by information asymmetry.Under the spontaneous quality disclosure model,enterprises convey quality information at the initial price of the product,and enterprises with higher product quality are at a disadvantage instead.Even in industries where disclosure standards are not yet perfect,companies with higher product quality should take the initiative to disclose product quality information to consumers.(2)The government should set quality disclosure standards for new products in a timely manner.Mandatory disclosure of new product information implemented by the government can eliminate quality information asymmetry in the early stage of the market and motivate enterprises to improve the efficiency of R&D and innovation.For new product markets and emerging fields,the government should timely develop and revise industry quality disclosure standards and vigorously develop the mandatory quality disclosure model.(3)Starting from consumer surplus,industry characteristics need to be considered in the process of implementing mandatory disclosure.For industries with weak innovation level and fast fading product value,mandatory quality disclosure cannot be adopted for maximum consumer surplus,and it may be a better choice to operate with market forces.