Pricing And Information Disclosure Strategies Of Retailers Under Two-Stage Sales

This paper mainly studies the application of dynamic game theory and prospect theory.By using incomplete information dynamic game theory to model the two-stage sales problem of retailers,this paper studies the optimal sales strategy of retailers in two-stage sales.There are usually two basic strategies for retailers in two-stage sales:one is the mark-down strategy,which means that the second stage uses price reduction promotion to clear the inventory.The other is the mark-up strategy,which means that the first stage is discounted to attract consumers and the second stage restores the original price.This paper studies the optimal pricing problems of retailers using mark-down strategy and mark-up strategy respectively and analyzes the optimal information disclosure strategy of retailers.Furthermore,by using the prospect theory proposed by Kahneman and Tversky,this paper studies the optimal pricing and information disclosure strategies of retailers in two-stage sales with consumer reviews and explores the impact of consumers’psychological factors on the optimal pricing and information disclosure strategies of retailers.This paper proves that the optimal disclosure strategy of retailers under the three scenarios is threshold strategy,and the existence of optimal threshold is also proven.Meanwhile,this paper points out that compared with the market under symmetric information,retailers in the market under asymmetric information can obtain more profits by selectively disclosing product quality information.Finally,this paper indicates that the strength of consumers’ reference point effect significantly affects the disclosure threshold of retailers,and the stronger the reference point effect,the higher the disclosure threshold of retailers.