Research On The Relationship Between Vertical Part-Time Senior Executives And Corporate Public Welfare Donation

The 19th Party Congress proposed to thoroughly implement the charity law,promote the continuous good development of China’s philanthropy development,as well as better play the role of China’s public welfare in promoting social progress and sharing the fruits of development with members of society.As an important social responsibility bearer,enterprises should enhance the construction and improvement of their own social responsibility consciousness in accordance with the mental of the 19th Party Congress.In the case of the brand new general environment,corporate public welfare donations have gradually become an important part of their social responsibility,and are called the highest form of corporate social responsibility,which is known as the highest form of corporate social liability,which has an important role in promoting the development of enterprises and social welfare,and thus has attracted widespread attention from academia and the community.Under the modern enterprise system,corporate donation decisions are often the result of a game between executives and major shareholders to maximize their own utility,and the efficiency of corporate social responsibility fulfillment can be reduced due to delegated agency problem and cost.To solve this problem,mitigate information dissymmetry and optimize the efficiency of corporate decision making.principal-agent problems and costs,in the process of increasing the control of major shareholders,vertical concurrent executives,as one of the specific means,are often set to directly intervene in the business decision-making activities of enterprises,enhancing the network relationship of vertical linkage and information exchange relationship between enterprises,which can play a role in corporate charitable giving to some extenthas.On the basis of documented and empirical studies,this paper explores the following questions:What are the mechanisms underlying the relations between vertical and part-time executives and corporate philanthropic giving?What is the mechanism of different property rights in moderating the relations between vertical executives and corporate philanthropic giving?In view of the fact that equity checks and balances are widely used in listed companies,do companies with different degrees of equity checks and balances impact the connection between vertical and part-time senior managements as well as enterprise philanthropic giving?This paper presents the relations in between vertical and part-time senior managements and public welfare donations,on the bisis of the corporate social responsibility theory,higher echelon theory and principal-agent theoryand proposes the role of property rights and equity checks and balances in the relationship between vertical and part-time executives and public welfare donations,taking into account the internal and external governance environment and realistic background of listed companies.In addition,the study also proposes the moderating role played by the characteristic of property rights and equity checks and balances in the relationship between vertical part-time senior managements and corporate public welfare donations.Regarding the empirical test,this study collected data from 20,609 samples of A-share publicly traded companieslisted in Shanghai and Shenzhen from 2014 to 2020,and used relevant statistical software to analyze and test,so as to empirically test the mechanism of the role of vertical part-time senior managements on firm public welfare donations,and analyze the role of property rights and level of shareholding checks and balances in regulating the link in intermediate vertical part-time senior managements as well as enterprise public welfare donations.We also analyze the role of the nature of ownership and equity balance in regulating the relationship between vertical executives and corporate philanthropic giving.In this paper,a series of theoretical derivations and analyses lead to the following conclusions:First,the existence of vertical and part-time executives can effectively promote the level of charitable giving by public companies.Secondly,the nature of property rights can influence the premium quality’s mechanism of vertical part-time senior managements on firm philanthropic giving to a certain extent,and the positive effect of vertical part-time on corporate philanthropic giving is more obvious in state-owned enterprises.Third,good results of vertical part-time senior managements positions is affected by the level of average degree of shareholding,and higher levels of equity checks and balances can enhance the positive effect of vertical concurrent supervisors on corporate philanthropic giving.The following future outlook and expectations are mainly derived from the results of the extrapolation in this paper:first,encourage the creation of vertical part-time executives and actively bring into play the supervision effect brought by them.At the level of listed companies,we should actively promote the formation of vertical linkage between them and their major shareholders,and encourage and actively guide the creation of vertical part-time executives;at the level of major shareholders,we should enhance the supervision of corporate management through the linkage between major shareholders and corporate major managements,and effectively reduce the intra-company principal-agent conflict;at the level of regulatory authorities,we should enhance the supervision effect of vertical part-time executives,and actively guide the behavior of vertical part-time executives by improving the reward and punishment mechanism.At the level of surveillance agency,they should pay more attention to the monitoring effect of vertical concurrent executives,actively guide the behavior of vertical concurrent executives by improving the reward and punishment mechanism,and promote listed companies to reasonably arrange vertical concurrent executives.Second,improve the corporate shareholding structure.In the process of adjusting the equity structure of enterprises,on the one hand,the equity should be moderately concentrated rather than excessively concentrated,and the degree of shareholding checks and balances of listed companies should be appropriately improved to form a reasonable equity structure that matches the enterprise;on the other hand,the equity should not be too fragmented to avoid inefficiency of enterprise decision-making.