Game Study On The Evolution Of Carbon Emission Reduction Between Government And Manufacturing Enterprises Under The Carbon Trading Mechanism

With the progress of society and economic development,the world will face the problems of environmental pollution and climate change,which have received high attention from the international community.Countries around the world are seeking ways to curb global warming and reduce carbon emissions from various fields such as politics,economy,energy,and environment.Since the implementation of the reform and opening up policy,China’s manufacturing industry has grown rapidly.However,the development process of the manufacturing industry is accompanied by ecological problems such as high energy consumption,high carbon emissions,non renewable resources,and unsustainable development.The current situation of China’s manufacturing industry is not optimistic,and the carbon emission reduction problem of manufacturing enterprises will face huge challenges.In the historical process of China’s socialist modernization,the country actively promotes the dual carbon goal,and enterprises actively carry out carbon reduction is an important condition for building the concept of natural,harmonious,and symbiotic economic development,and achieving energy-saving and emission reduction social green development.As the guide of society,it is particularly important for the government to formulate appropriate energy-saving and emission reduction policies based on the national conditions and current era background to promote corporate carbon reduction.In carbon emission reduction work,the government should actively supervise the emission reduction behavior of enterprises through government regulatory measures,and provide subsidies or punishments for the behavior of enterprises.Enterprises will identify policy orientations and respond to emission reduction policies to reduce carbon emissions,achieving a win-win situation for both government and enterprise.Based on this research,the mechanism and influencing factors of carbon emissions reduction between government and enterprises are crucial for manufacturing enterprises to reduce carbon emissions and achieve lowcarbon and healthy development.Firstly,an evolutionary game model for carbon emissions reduction between the government and manufacturing enterprises under a carbon free trading mechanism was established using relevant theories.A return matrix was constructed to solve the model,analyzing the evolution paths and stable strategies of the government and enterprises in different situations.The parameter assignment was simulated and analyzed based on the actual market situation.From the above analysis,it is found that both government and enterprise cannot achieve a stable state where both parties actively take action only under consumer low-carbon preferences.This is because the government lacks external constraints,and rational governments pursue maximum profits.When enterprises reduce emissions,they will adopt non regulatory strategies to obtain more benefits.Through further research,it can be concluded that appropriate constraints on the government can enable both government and enterprise to actively achieve a stable state of regulation and emission reduction.The proposal and development of the dual carbon target have led higher level governments and the public to pay more attention to the carbon reduction of governments and enterprises.Therefore,the punishment of higher level governments and the willingness of enterprises will constrain the government.The carbon trading mechanism effectively improves the evolutionary behavior between government and enterprises,and the introduction of a carbon trading mechanism can further optimize the carbon emission reduction path.Based on the above information,an evolutionary game model between the government and manufacturing enterprises under a carbon trading mechanism is constructed,and a profit matrix is constructed to solve the model.The evolution phase diagrams of the government and enterprises in different situations are analyzed,and the evolution paths and stable strategies of both parties are analyzed.The parameter assignment is simulated and analyzed in each situation based on the actual market situation.Visualize and analyze the evolution path of carbon emission reduction behavior of government and enterprise,and explore the possible evolution of government and enterprise at different stages of carbon market development.The research results indicate that in the early development stage of the carbon market,the scale and price of carbon trading are relatively small,and the profits obtained by both government and enterprise in carbon trading are relatively small.The carbon trading market has a small impact on the evolutionary behavior of the government and enterprise game,and a game equilibrium(without regulation or emission reduction)will be achieved.When the scale and price of carbon trading in the carbon trading market increase,the long-term evolution of the government and enterprises will form a combination of(regulation,emission reduction)and(non regulation,non emission reduction)strategies,which also indicates that the carbon market is in a growth stage.At the mature stage of the carbon market,the carbon price and carbon trading scale are relatively large at this time,and carbon trading has a greater impact on the evolutionary behavior of both the government and enterprises.The government can obtain more profits from the purchase and sale of enterprises.Enterprises spend more on purchasing carbon quotas,and the profits from selling carbon quotas will also be higher.Both government and enterprise will adopt active strategies to obtain greater profits,ultimately achieving a stable strategy where both parties actively take action.The initial intention will to some extent affect the evolutionary behavior of the government and enterprises.The initial willingness of oneself and the other party will have an impact on the carbon reduction of government and enterprises.In the existing government enterprise carbon reduction game,most scholars have ignored the impact of external mechanisms on the evolution behavior of government enterprise carbon reduction,and there are few studies that incorporate consumer preferences into the evolution game model of government enterprise carbon reduction.The evolutionary game model in this article takes into account consumer low-carbon preferences and the driving effect of carbon trading mechanisms on carbon reduction.By exploring the carbon reduction issues between governments and manufacturing enterprises under the carbon trading mechanism,numerical simulations are conducted to analyze the carbon reduction rehearsal behavior of government and enterprises at different stages of the carbon market,which can promote manufacturing enterprises to reduce carbon emissions and promote the development of the carbon trading market.