Research On Evolutionary Game Of Multi-Agent Behaviour In The Mixed Supply Model Of Rural Public Facility Projects Based On Two-Stage

The “14th Five-Year Plan” puts forward the comprehensive implementation of the rural revitalization strategy.As a basic public service in rural areas,rural public facility project is important support for rural revitalization.At present,the mixed supply model formed by the cooperation between governments and multiple social agents is a dominant form of public facility project construction in China.However,due to the special context of Chinese “Agriculture,Rural Areas and Farmers”,the mixed supply model of rural public facility project faces the influence of complex game behaviour of multiple subjects in the implementation process,thus exposing a series of inefficient development dilemmas.Therefore,how to improve the efficiency of the construction and operation of the mixed supply model of rural public facility project has become an important issue in the process of comprehensive promotion of rural revitalization in the new era.This research is based on the strategic context of the comprehensive implementation of rural revitalization development and explores how to build a long-term mechanism for the construction and operation of rural public facility project under the mixed supply model.Firstly,this research analyses the current development of rural public facility supply in China and the connotation and characteristics of the three types of supply models through a review of relevant concepts and basic theories.Secondly,this research focuses on the mixed supply model of rural public facility project and analyses the realistic inefficiency dilemma faced by this model.Then,in order to reveal the causes of the dilemma,this study puts forward the research hypothesis that there is two-stage multi-agents game behaviour in the mixed model supply of rural public facility project.The evolutionary game models of different participants in the project planning-construction stage and the operation-management stage are constructed respectively to analyse the game equilibrium mechanisms and evolutionary stabilization strategies of each participant in different stages.Matlab software was used for numerical simulation.Accordingly,the results of the model are verified and analyzed by practical cases.Finally,corresponding policy recommendations are put forward.The results show that:(1)At the present stage,at present,in the implementation of the mixed supply model of rural public facility project,there are some distorting behaviour of participants,such as the dislocation of supply and demand decision-making,low participation of villagers,speculation of operators and short-sightedness of grassroots governments.As a result,rural public facility project has fallen into the dilemma of inefficient development,such as being build but nobody used,being built but lack of management,and poorly operated in the long term.(2)The reason for the low efficiency of the mixed supply model of rural public facilities lies in the fact that there are two stages in the supply process of the project,each stage reflects the game behavior between different actors,and the non-equilibrium of the cooperative game mechanism between multiple agents will cause the segmentation of the phased objectives of the project and the distortion of the supply behavior.(3)In the planning-construction stage of the project,the factors of policy promotion and incentives-punishments by the superior government play an important guiding role in leading the planning and construction behaviour of grassroots governments.While the development willingness and governance level of grassroots governments have an important endogenous influence in the decision-making behavior of grassroots governments in the construction stage of rural public facility project.In addition,the villagers’ demand for the project and the degree of disclosure also influence the grassroots governments’ choices of supply strategy.(4)In the operation-management stage of the project,the lack of follow-up supervision by the superior government,the rationalist mindset of grassroots governments,the profit-pursuing operation of the operator and the lack of villagers’ participation and supervision are the main cause of inefficiencies in the operation of rural public facility project.Based on the above findings,this research puts forward several policy suggestions to promote the development of a mixed supply model of rural public facility project at the levels of governments,operators and villagers respectively.such as building a system of supervision and participation by superior governments in the whole process of rural public facility project,establishing a scientific and effective vertical inter-governmental assessment and reward-punishment mechanism for project supply,implementing the multiple responsibilities of grassroots governments in the whole process of project supply,enhancing the endogenous motivation of grassroots governments to promote rural development,raising the social responsibility awareness of the operators and promoting their transformation into social enterprises,strengthening the depth of government-enterprise cooperation,enhancing villagers’ awareness and ability to express their public needs,and enhancing democratic participation in the governance of project supply.