A Study Of The Eisenhower Administration’s Aid Policy Toward Burma (1953-1960)

Since independence in 1948,Burma has pursued a pro-Western,neutral foreign policy,through which it has sought assistance from the United Kingdom and the United States.Washington did not respond positively to Rangoon’s request for assistance because of its distrust of “neutralism” diplomacy and the political turmoil in Burma,but naturally viewed the UK as the backbone and major player in aid to Burma.With the establishment of the People’s Republic of China and the outbreak of the Korean War,the U.S.actively adjusted its Asian strategy and provided limited assistance to Burma under a framework of Anglo-American coordination.When Eisenhower entered the White House in 1953,he continued the Truman administration’s policy of maintaining that Burma’s neutral foreign policy was politically immoral,and the Burmese government cut off U.S.economic assistance because of the Chiang Army in northern Burma.The Bandung Conference of 1955 changed the U.S.perception of neutral diplomacy,and Washington gradually established the strategic goal of drawing Burma back to the Western camp through aid,and began to actively provide economic and military assistance to Rangoon.Shortly thereafter,China and the Soviet Union advocated peaceful coexistence with Third World countries and provided large-scale aid to the latter.In response to the“Sino-Soviet economic offensive,” Washington gradually embraced the concept of neutral diplomacy and established the goal of “maintaining Burma’s independent status”.In the process,the U.S.continued to make “compromises” and “concessions”in an attempt to decommunize Burma through aid.Thus,the paradoxical phenomenon of the donor country being passive in aid negotiations and the recipient country taking the initiative in aid negotiations has emerged.The root cause of this phenomenon is the gradual change in the U.S.perception and understanding of neutral foreign policy.In general,the U.S.government expects to use aid to influence Burma’s domestic and foreign affairs and to enhance its relations with the “free world”.The Burmese government expects to receive “no political strings attached” aid to complete its national program,strengthen its military and promote political stability and economic development in Burma.The differences in strategic perceptions and aid objectives between the two sides constitute a structural contradiction in U.S.aid to Burma,and thus pose a major obstacle to negotiations between the two sides.This contradiction became an important factor in the Kennedy administration’s attempts to promote development assistance in Burma.As a result,the nature of the struggle between the U.S.and Soviet camps in Burma gradually changed from an ideological battle to a battle over the path of development and institutional advantages.