Disability: A normative evaluation

This dissertation is a normative evaluation of disability.;In the first chapter, I critically evaluate the medical and social models of disability as understood within the fields of disability studies, sociology and philosophy, and I argue that both fail to adequately capture the concept of disability. The medical model as it is traditionally described in the literature assumes that (1) mental and physical impairments cause disadvantage; and (2) mental and physical impairments are value-free concepts that are determined by empirical science. I argue both claims are false. In the last section of chapter one, I analyze and critique the social model of disability.;In the second chapter, I argue for a normative conception of disability that avoids the problems of the medical and social models. Disability consists of an impairment that adversely affects a person's vital or basic functions for well-being in a specific social environment. After explaining my conception of disability, I respond to objections to my view from both the defenders of the medical and social model of disability. Then, I respond to a potential objection that disability is a neutral trait. Finally, I respond to an objection that my conception of disability collapses the traditional distinction between disabilities and traits that are associated with either a lack of talent or harmful character traits, such as laziness or weakness of will. In addition, I distinguish my conception of disability from other welfare theories of disability.;In the third chapter, I examine a possible normative response to disability. I evaluate the normative principles espoused by the Disability Rights Movement that have been enacted in the Americans with Disability Act (ADA). Among disability theorists and activists, the minority group model of disabilities is the preferred normative response to disabilities. The minority group model understands disability as a civil rights issue. Society has created a distinct minority group of disabled persons through stereotypical attitudes and prejudice. The remedy is to use anti-discrimination legislation to remove discriminatory barriers. The goal of this chapter is to rethink the minority group rights model of disability. I argue that this model is insufficient for treating people with disabilities as equals. After I have examined the minority group model of disabilities, I argue that it fails to secure equal opportunity for people with disabilities.;In the fourth chapter, I focus on the possibility of curing disability. As a result of emerging technologies such as the Human Genome Project, it may soon become possible to affect human genotypes and, as a consequence, cure or prevent disease and disability. Disability scholars generally oppose this kind of treatment because they believe it is associated with the medical model of disability, and its faults. According to the medical model, people with disabilities fail to meet some sort of normative ideal of good health, and disability is seen as a personal tragedy. This requires dependence on doctors and rehabilitation services. Importantly, scholars and advocates of disability rights believe that this view is stigmatizing. I argue that although this concern is legitimate, we should not rule out trying to remedy impairments medically if they are associated with limited opportunity and a life full of disadvantage. If there is more than one possible alternative to removing the harm or disadvantage associated with impairment and disability, it is reasonable to ask which strategy would be the most effective unless there are morally significant reasons to choose one option over the other.;In the final section of my dissertation, I examine whether our obligations to cure or prevent disabilities are a matter of justice, and specifically whether justice would favor a policy of curing or accommodating disability. In From Chance to Choice: Genetics and Justice, Allen Buchanan, Dan Brock, Norman Daniels and Daniel Wikler (Buchanan et al.) argue that justice and public policy may require that we favor a policy of curing or preventing disabilities over policies of inclusion and accommodation. Buchanan et al. argue that policies of inclusion and accommodation have costs on the non-disabled, and the slogan "change society, not people" if taken literally will usurp the legitimate rights of the non-disabled. I argue that Buchanan et al. are wrong. Their argument relies on a straw position and a false analogy. Moreover, the proper normative response may differ for different disabilities, as each disability may cause a different type of disadvantage and therefore the costs of rectifying or minimizing the disadvantage of each disability will be different. (Abstract shortened by UMI.)...