A Study On Incentive Criteria For Grass-livestock Balance Based On Opportunity Cost Method

Grassland is China’s terrestrial ecosystem and pastoralism is the main source of income for herders.In order to protect the ecological environment of grassland and achieve sustainable use of resources,China has established a grassland ecological compensation mechanism.Since the implementation of the grassland ecological protection subsidy and incentive policy in Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region,certain results have been achieved,but there are still problems such as low compensation standards and low supervision of overloading and overgrazing by herders,which to a certain extent affect the effect of the implementation of the ecological protection policy.The reasonable formulation of compensation standard is the core and difficulty of grassland ecological protection compensation policy.This thesis firstly compares the relevant domestic and foreign literature on ecological compensation and provides a general analysis of grassland ecological protection compensation policy in Inner Mongolia.,this thesis uses opportunity cost theory,cost and benefit theory,sustainable development theory and Maslow’s demand theory as the theoretical basis,and uses the data of 222 effective samples from four herding banners in Inner Mongolia,namely,Balinyou Banner,Keshiketeng Banner and Xinbaerhuzuo Banner,Chenbaerhu Banner.The relationship between herding households’ grass management area and overload rate was analyzed using multiple linear regression models,and the opportunity cost method was further used to calculate the income loss of herding households’ livestock reduction,so as to measure the grass-livestock balance incentive standard suitable for small and medium-sized herding households.The following conclusions were drawn:(1)The current situation of grassland ecological subsidy and reward policy is summarized and analyzed: the ecological indicators such as grassland vegetation cover,height,forage production and species diversity have been improved substantially in the whole region.While the grassland subsidy and incentive policy has achieved results,the implementation process has a number of problems,such as the difficulty to curb the overload of herdsmen,the lack of grassland supervision,and the narrow channels for herdsmen to increase their income;the large difference in the contracted pasture area of herdsmen leading to the excessive difference in grassland subsidy and incentive income;Compensation funds to be issued in an optimized manner,the low grassland ecological compensation standard,which is difficult to compensate for the loss of reduced livestock,etc.(2)The smaller the pasture area,the higher the overload rate of herding households.The coefficient of the effect of pasture area on overload rate is-0.0030,indicating that for every 100 hm2 decrease in pasture area,the overload rate increases by 30%.The main body of pasture overload overgrazing is small and medium-sized herding households.(3)The increase or decrease in the number of livestock raised,the rate of livestock slaughter,the price of a sheep unit and the variable cost determine the level of opportunity cost for herders to implement the policy,independent of the fixed cost.Through calculation,the appropriate grass-livestock balance subsidy rate for small and medium-sized herding households is RMB14.76/mu.Based on the above research findings,the policy recommendations of this thesis are as follows:(1)Improve grassland rule of law and establish an effective supervision system;(2)Encourage herdsmen to carry out pastureland transfer,develop grassland-related industries and increase employment channels;(3)Improve the way bonuses are paid,appropriately raise the reward standard for small and medium-sized herdsmen to balance grass and livestock,and encourage social forces to participate in ecological protection compensation.