| In 2023,the Central Committee and the State Council of the Communist Party of China issued the No.1 central document titled "Opinions on Fully Advancing the Key Work of Rural Revitalization in 2023",which emphasized the need to fully promote food production and comprehensively strengthen the foundation of food security.This marks the 20 th central document guiding the work on agriculture,rural areas and farmers since the 21 st century.However,with a large population and limited arable land resources,the disorderly expansion of non-food crops on arable land has led to new contradictions between food production and economic benefits,posing a serious threat to both national food security and farmland protection.Current research has mainly focused on the influencing factors and impacts of non-food crops on arable land,with less attention paid to the analysis of the game between the interests of various stakeholders involved in non-food crop production on arable land.Thus,the current research on preventing the issue of non-food crops on arable land is still incomplete.Based on stakeholder theory and evolutionary game theory,this paper analyzes the spatial and temporal characteristics of non-food land use change in 55 districts and counties of 14 prefecture-level cities in Liaoning Province from 2000 to 2020,and divides them into different spatial zones.By summarizing existing literature on stakeholders that have a significant impact on non-food land use change,a three-party evolutionary game model involving local government,industrial and commercial capital,and farmers is constructed to explore how different spatial zones affect the strategic choices and benefits of stakeholders in non-food land use change.The paper also investigates strategies that can achieve evolutionary stability for each stakeholder and conducts numerical simulation analysis on the equilibrium scenarios for stakeholder stability.Through a cost-benefit analysis of stakeholders,this study seeks to identify the key factors that influence non-food land use change and proposes policy recommendations for preventing it.The study findings indicate that:(1)During the 20-year period from 2000 to 2020,the non-grain land use rate and area of the study area showed a fluctuating "M" shape curve,with fluctuation amplitude gradually stabilizing,indicating that non-grain land use in the study area is gradually declining and tending to stabilize.(2)The spatial distribution of non-grain land use in the study area from 2000 to 2020 showed a "high in the north and low in the south" pattern.The concentration of high non-grain land use areas has been alleviated,and by 2020,the non-grain land use degree in the study area has shifted from being primarily high-value areas to mid-value areas.(3)The tripartite game of interests among the three stakeholders in non-grain land use in the study area has three equilibrium scenarios.In these three equilibrium scenarios,the policy execution level of the local government plays a leading role in the strategic choices of the three stakeholders,the anti-non-grain land use strategy choice of industrial and commercial capital plays a decisive role in the implementation of anti-non-grain land use policies,and the strategic choice of farmers has limited impact on preventing nongrain land use.(4)The determining factors in the tripartite game of interests among the stakeholders in non-grain land use in the study area include government pressure,policy execution level,regulatory cost,policy subsidies provided by local governments,cooperation cost,and farmers’ income.(5)The tripartite stakeholders in different nongrain land use spatial zones should work together to achieve the goal of preventing nongrain land use while ensuring the maximization of interests for the local government,industrial and commercial capital,and farmers.The research results have practical significance for easing the contradiction between non-grain land use and food production and for land conservation. |
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